Regulation of transmission line capacity and reliability in electric networks by Celebi, Metin
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/47
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2000
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Regulation of transmission line capacity
and reliability in electric networks
Author: Metin Celebi
Boston College
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Economics
REGULATION OF TRANSMISSION LINE CAPACITY AND
RELIABILITY IN ELECTRIC NETWORKS
a dissertation
by
METIN CELEBI
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
September 2000
© copyright by METIN CELEBI
2000
BOSTON COLLEGE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES
Metin CelebiThe thesis of:
----_..:..::=.==-::..-.....;::;.;=.;;:;;.;;;;...----------
entitled: R;;.,;;;;EG~~=...;;...T...;;;;I..;..ON___.;.O_F.....;L.....;I_NE__..;CAP__..;.,;;.A..;;.,,;C;.,;;;;;ITY~_AN_D _
RELIABILITY IN ELECTRIC NETWORKS
submitted to the Department of: Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of:
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences has been read and
approved by the Committee;;
) ,. < f' '0" b'· > < < bG
Member: Richard J. Anlot t
Date: 101 5/.1.1)00
ABSTRACT
This thesis is composed of two essays that analyze the incentives and optimal regula-
tion of a monopolist line owner in providing capacity and reliability. Similar analyses in
the economic literature resulted in under-investment by an unregulated line owner when
line reliability was treated as an exogenous variable. However, reliability should be cho-
sen on the basis of economic principles as well, taking into account not only engineering
principles but also the preferences of electricity users.
When reliability is treated as a choice variable, both over- and under-investment by
the line owner becomes possible. The result depends on the cross-cost elasticity of line
construction and on the interval in which the optimal choices of capacity take place. We
present some sufficient conditions that leads to definite results about the incentives of
the line owner.
We also characterize the optimal regulation of the line owner under incomplete infor-
mation. Our analysis shows that the existence of a line is justified for the social planner
when the reliability of other lines on the network is not too high, or when the marginal
cost of generation at the expensive generating plant is high. The expectation of higher
demand in the future makes the regulator less likely to build the line if it will be congested
and reliability of other lines is high enough. It is always optimal to have a congested line
under complete information, but not necessarily under incomplete information.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electric power is a vital input to production and commercial sectors, and plays
an important role in our lives with its uses in lighting, air-conditioning, com-
puters and in many other household activities. Electricity sectors around the
world account for more than $ 1 trillion of annual sales revenue, and more than
$ 200 billion in annual investment.!
Many countries started restructuring their electricity sectors in the last decade
to improve competition and to obtain benefits from inter-regional trading. Some
countries including the U.S. opened the generation stage to competition, which
is no longer believed to be a natural monopoly. But the transmission and the dis-
tribution stages still possess the characteristic of a natural monopoly, therefore
they are still being regulated.
In the U.S., regulators compensate transmission line owners on a cost-recovery
basis, instead of incentive-based or value-based schemes. However, this picture
is changing too. First of all, users of transmission networks in some areas (such
as New York, New England, or the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM))
are being charged on the basis of congestion pricing (a transmission pricing
lSee Joskow [11], p. 25.
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mechanism in which users pay for the cost of congestion they create by their
transactions). Second, some attempts are being made to change the structure
of ownership and control of transmission assets. In February 2000, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued an order proposing the forma-
tion of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) that will be responsible
for operation and planning (investment) of transmission assets. (FERC [9])
Currently, about 35% of the U.S. electricity markets are governed by various
versions of RTOs. 2 The basic idea behind the FERC order is to consolidate
the operation (and possibly ownership) of transmission assets so that strong
externalities in transmission networks can be internalized, and also to stimulate
investment in transmission. According to FERC Chairman James Hoecker, the
objective is to give new RTOs the necessary incentives to expand transmission
to meet a growing market.
Leaving the decisions to invest in transmission networks to RTOs boils down
to delegating the investment decisions to a coalition of the owners of trans-
mission assets. The natural alternative to this decentralized mechanism is the
regulation of these decisions. This thesis aims to analyze the comparison of these
two approaches. The first paper in the thesis considers a setting in which the
2The Wall Street Journal [21], p. A2.
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transmission pricing of electricity is done by using a locational pricing model,
nodal pricing. The transmission prices obtained in this model reflects the true
marginal costs of congestion, hence they are efficient. These optimal transmis-
sion prices can be used to find the shadow value of transmission capacity for any
line on the network. Since the shadow value represents the marginal value to
society of transmission capacity, it can be used to reward the owners of trans-
mission lines. We consider such a reward mechanism for providing capacity in
order to analyze the incentives of a line owner to invest in line capacity and line
reliability in chapter 2.
The third chapter characterizes the optimal regulation of line capacity and
reliability for a single transmission line under incomplete information. This
paper too uses the nodal pricing model to obtain the shadow value of a line. We
also present some results showing the effect of changes in electricity demand,
generation cost, and reliability of other lines on the regulator's decision to build
a new line.
The conclusion chapter gives a summary of results in the thesis, and provides
some policy recommendations.
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2. INCENTIVES
AN ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVES TO PROVIDE LINE CAPACITY
AND RELIABILITY IN DEREGULATED POWER NETWORKS
2.1. Introduction
Electricity markets in many countries are going through a transformation which
mostly takes the form of deregulation. The process has started with opening
the generation stage to competition so that market forces could operate in this
segment which is no longer believed to be a natural monopoly. The next step is
the re-configuration of the transmission segment which still possesses the char-
acteristics of a natural monopoly. The current issues are who should operate
an existing transmission network and who should decide on the amount of in-
vestment in the network. We will concentrate on the latter issue, and examine
the incentives to provide transmission capacity and reliability by using a specific
mechanism in the operation of those transmission assets.
9
Reliability in the delivery of electric power used to be seen as an exogenous
variable by planners3. It was determined using engineering rules, which were
viewed as constraints by the decision-making authority4. However, reliability
should be chosen on the basis of economic principles as well, taking into account
not only engineering principles but also the preferences of electricity users. Re-
liability is truly an endogenous variable. The materials5 and technology6 used
in the construction of transmission lines, the level of maintenance expenditures,
and the transmission capacity of lines constitute the major determinants of the
reliability for the whole network7•
3The only exception that I am aware of is an experimental project by Duke Power Company.
This project aims to perform planning activities by taking into account the value of reliability
to their customers. See Dalton et al [7] for details.
4See Munasinghe [15], p. 24 for a more detailed treatment of the current approach to relia-
bility. An example of these exogenous constraints is the N-l rule, or first contingency criterion.
It requires that if one component fails, the others must be sufficient to serve the demand. An-
other example is the practice (in Brazil) of putting a direct constraint on reliability, saying that
demand must be served 95 % of the time. See Dalton et. al. [7] p. 1400, and Nasser [16] p. 38.
51 will only mention two examples. First, either rod gaps or surge arresters can be used to
protect transformers, reactors, and other components from overvoltages; rod gaps are cheaper,
but also less reliable. Second, transmission line poles can be made from wood, steel or concrete;
wood is cheaper but can be less reliable. (From the Encyclopedia of Physical Science and
Technology [8])
6For example, a new technology called FACTS allows the operator to automatically re-
distribute flow when the power flowing on a line reaches its limit. Such a technology enables
the system operator to prevent line breakdowns and repair costs due to overflows. Installing
FACTS definitely improves reliability, but at an extra cost.
7The formation of reliability coordinating councils (e.g. North American Electric Reliabil-
ity Council, NERC) by electric utilities was motivated by the need for operating and design
standards for the industry. The existence of these institutions indicates that investors have a
multitude of options affecting the reliability of the system. Even under this coordinated struc-
ture of the industry, electric utilities do not always conform to those standards. As a senior
transmission planner said: "We have a line I would like to monitor, but I do not think we
10
The model described in this paper investigates the incentives of a monop-
olistic line owner choosing both reliability and capacity of a transmission line
subject to nodal pricing of electricity. I will compare these capacity and reliabil-
ity levels to the ones chosen by a benevolent social planner. Holding reliability
constant, the line owner is likely to choose under-investment to increase con-
gestion rents8 . Does this result generalize when reliability of the line is also a
choice variable? If not, then we could find out conditions under which the line
owner chooses the socially optimum level of capacity. That would imply the
regulation of line capacity is unnecessary under those conditions, and regulation
of reliability would be enough. Moreover, over-investment in line capacity would
be a possible outcome.
In this paper I present some conditions each of which imply different results
for the comparison of investment by the social planner and the line owner. One
of the critical conditions is on cross-cost elasticity of line construction, which
basically measures the sensitivity of marginal cost of capacity to an increase
in reliability. If marginal cost of capacity is not very sensitive to a marginal
increase in reliability (Le. cross-cost elasticity less than unity) and if optimal
would like the results." Another quote: "A district engineer, after being informed that a copper
conductor was annealed and had lost most of its strength, said, "1 do not think we can afford
to replace it this year." (From Electrical World [20], p. 18).
8See Nasser [16] p. 175, and Bushnell and Stoft [3] p. 2.
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capacities fall into a specific interval, then the line owner chooses too much
capacity and too much reliability compared to the socially optimal levels. But
we obtain under-investment in capacity if the elasticity is greater than unity.
Another of the results show that the line owner chooses the first-best levels of
capacity and reliability if capacity choices fall into a specific interval.
The plan of the paper is as follows. I will describe the institutional setting
and the technology of electricity transmission in the next two sections. The third
section shows how spot pricing of electricity is done and explains the shadow
value of line capacity, which will be used in the analysis of investment. The
investment and reliability problems of the social planner and line owner are
then presented in section four. The analysis of conditions that yield specific
results regarding the choices of the line owner are shown in section five, which
is followed by the conclusion.
2.2. Institutional Set-up
Since the focus of the study will be on long-term decisions of investment and
reliability, I will ignore the imperfections in the spot pricing of electricity. I aim
to highlight the incentives for investment and reliability, rather than analyzing
the interactions between the market imperfections in the spot pricing and the
12
imperfections in investment and reliability choice.
The spot pricing of electricity is assumed to follow nodal pricing as introduced
by Schweppe et. al. [18]9, and used by Hogan [10]. A system operator organizes
auctions in which demand and supply bids of users yield the price of electricity
at each node of the network. Nodal pricing model in various forms not only is
the present paradigm of choice of policy makers (as in PJM (Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland network), NEPOOL (New England) and NYPP (New York))
but its optimality relies on far less restrictive assumptions than its principal
rival10 • The basic assumption for the social efficiency of the nodal pricing model
is absence of market power among users of electricity, while the decentralized
market model additionally requires the absence of market power among the
owners of transmission lines.
For the structure of ownership and control rights of the transmission net-
work, I argue that the line owner should be regulated. Economies of scale in
line construction and highly concentrated ownership patterns in most countriesll
make this a more plausible alternative than the decentralized investment systems
9See Schweppe et. al. [18], pp. 151-156 for their nodal pricing model.
lOThe alternative is a decentralized pricing system, such as the tradable physical rights ap-
proach by Chao and Peck [6].
11A few utility companies jointly own most of the regional transmission networks in many
states of the U.S. In the U.K, there is a single transmission company, called the National Grid
Company (NGC).
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proposed in the literature. The most prominent model for the latter (by Bush-
nell and Stoft [4]) uses the instrument of Transmission Congestion Contracts
(TCC)12 in order to give the right incentives to line owners for investment. Fur-
thermore, Bushnell and Stoft consider only a mechanism for the provision of
line capacity, hence investment on reliability is ignored. However, we show in
this paper that decisions to provide capacity and reliability do in general affect
each other. Therefore, we take the position of regulating both line capacity and
reliability.
The regulation of a single line owner was hinted at by Bushnell and Stoft
[4]13, and was analyzed by Nasser [16]. The latter considered the dimension of
line capacity, but ignored the choice of reliability.
This paper presents the behavior of the line owner in an unregulated envi-
ronment, to highlight the distortion in incentives. The next step is to examine
and formulate the optimal regulation, which I have studied in Chapter 3.
12TCC's were introduced by Hogan [10]. A TCC is defined for a pair of nodes (i,j), and
gives its owner a prespecified quantity multipled by the difference in prices at node i and j.
Nodes specified in the contract are not necessarily connected in physical terms. Hence, a TCC
is essentially a financial instrument rather than a certificate to have the right to transfer electric
power from node i to j.
A variant of this approach will be used by New York Power Authority (NYPA). Investors who
pay for transmission expansion will receive TCC's as compensation.
13They said, "Transmission assets could be combined into a single entity that would have to
be closely regulated due to its substantial market power." (See page 90 in Bushnell and Stoft
[4])
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The choice of line reliability determines the probability of being in one of two
states of the world: either the line works or it fails. I assume that the system
operator and users learn the state of the world before the auction for spot pricing
is organized. However, investment and reliability decisions are made before the
state of the world is known. This is the natural way of timing, because invest-
ment decisions are generally made much less frequently than pricing decisions14 .
Hence, the timing of decisions is as follows:
(1) The firm chooses the capacity and reliability of line.
(2) The state of the world becomes known to everyone.
(3) The system operator chooses the dispatch, and calculates the shadow
value of line.
I assume perfect competition among users (or bidders) of electricity in auc-
tions that determine spot prices; hence, pricing is done optimally. Optimal prices
yield the shadow value of the line, and I assume the line owner gets payment on
the basis of shadow value. The shadow value becomes the price of line capac-
ity, or payment per unit of capacity installed on the transmission line. Nasser
[16] rightly named this as Natural Transmission Revenue, because shadow value
14In practice, auctions are held hourly, but investment decisions take place once in a couple
of years.
15
represents the true value of the marginal unit of capacity to society.
We are aware that rewarding the line owner by shadow value is not the
only possible mechanism. For example, a fixed payment or some kind of re-
imbursement for the cost of line construction are two of many possible reward
mechanisms. However, rewarding by shadow value has a nice property that the
shadow value represents society's marginal willingness to pay for line capacity.
Hence, it constitutes the demand curve for capacity. This is why we chose this
mechanism to analyze incentives of the line owner.
I assume that the system operator does not pay anything to the line owner
when the line fails, because the reliability of the line is totally controlled by the
owner.
Before proceeding to the results, I will present the transmission technology
in a simplified network model in the next section.
2.3. Electricity Transmission Technology
The technology of flows on electric power networks is different from the railroad
and communications networks. There are three major differences. First, a sup-
plier cannot address the generated power to a specific customer on the network,
because power networks are common pools. Second, the path of power flows
16
cannot be determined by users, the power chooses its own path according to the
laws of physics. Finally, storage of electricity is very costly, hence some form of
central coordination is needed to equate supply and demand and to make sure
that standards related to voltage, frequency and security are satisfied.
Electricity flows according to the laws of physics (or Kirchoff Laws15), not
according to pre-specified contract paths. For example, say a utility company
in Boston has a contract to sell electricity to a distributor in Michigan. One
might think that the power generated in Boston would flow directly on the
transmission line(s) connecting Boston and Michigan. But the reality is not
that simple: only a portion of the generated power will flow on the direct link,
and the remaining part will flow on other paths (possibly from Boston to New
York, and then to somewhere else, and finally to Michigan). This is called the
"loop-flow" phenomenon. Division of power among different paths depends on
relative impedances (a measure of resistance and reactance) of lines. More power
flows on lines that have less impedance.
A major consequence of the loop-flow phenomenon emerges when the net-
work is congested, Le. one or more of transmission lines have reached their
capacity to carry power. In this case, generators located at some specific areas
15See the appendix for power-flow technology for a more detailed analysis of Kirchoff Laws.
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of the network cannot put power into the network anymore (otherwise trans-
mission assets will be damaged). These generators are located in areas that
contribute to the congestion. At the same time, there are some other generators
on the network such that their location allows them to alleviate this congestion.
Roughly speaking, the first set of generators can be said to create negative ex-
ternalities because they are limiting the ability of other generators/consumers
to use the network. Similarly, the second set of generators can be said to create
positive externalities because they are enhancing the ability of some users to
translnit electricity by alleviating the transmission congestion.
Now let's illustrate this discussion on the triangular network as shown in
Figure 1. Suppose all lines have identical impedances. Then 1/3 of power
injected at node 1 will flow on lines (1,2) and (2,3), and the remaining 2/3
of it will flow on line (1,3) (since this path has half the impedance of the first
path, which is composed of two serially connected lines). Similarly, 1/3 of power
injected at node 2 will flow on lines (1,2) and (1,3), and the remaining 2/3 of
it will flow on line (2,3) .A derivation of these rules for power flows by using
Kirchoff Laws is given in the appendix in Chapter 5.
18
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If one of the lines fail, then the network is no longer triangular, and distribu-
tion of power flows will be different. If line (1,2) fails, then all power generated
at node 1 will flow on line (1,3), and all power generated at node 2 will flow
on line (2,3). If line (1,3) fails, then all power generated at node 1 will flow on
lines (1,2) and (2,3), and all power generated at node 2 will flow on line (2,3).
The last issue that we will illustrate is the congestion management. A system
operator solves the congestion problem by switching some of the generation from
the congestion-causing generators to congestion-relieving generators. When line
(1,2) is congested and line (1,3) is up, then we can no longer generate electricity
at node 1 (cheap generator) without also generating at node 2 (expensive gen-
erator). The optimal way to satisfy an additional unit of demand (for a given
level of capacity) is to generate 1/2 more unit at node 1, and 1/2 more unit at
node 2. In other words, a unit increase in the capacity of line (1,2) allows us to
generate 3/2 more units at node 1, and 3/2 units less at node 2. 16
Similarly, when line (1,2) is congested and line (1,3) is down, then a unit
increase in the capacity of line (1,2) allows us to generate one more unit at node
1 and one less unit at node 2.
16The number 3/2 comes from the fact that generating 3/2 more units at node 1 implies
1/2 more unit of power flowing from node 1 to node 2, and 3/2 less units generated at node 2
implies 1/2 less unit of power flowing from node 2 to node 1. The net flow from node 1 to node
2 becomes one unit, which is the initial increase in the capacity of line (1,2).
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2.3.1. A Simple Model of Electric Networks
The model used in this analysis will be the DC load approximation to the power
flow with no line loss. The network will be assumed to have three nodes, which
are connected by identical transmission lines in a triangular shape (see Figure
1). Voltage levels throughout the network are assumed to be held constant.
Nodes 1 and 2 are generator nodes, while node 3 is the demand node. Gen-
eration (or injection) by generator 1 and generator 2 are labeled qI and q2,
respectively, while the consumption at node 3 is labeled q3 . For illustrative
purposes, assume that generators have constant marginal cost production tech-
nologies with cland C2, respectively, and Cl < C2. Assume the inverse demand
function at node 3 is P3 (q3) = a - bq3, with the implied utility function of
Power flowing on line (i, j) from node i to node j is Pij . Assume that only line
(1,2), with a line capacity of K, has the possibility of congestion. I8 Moreover,
the reliability19 of line (1,2) is a decision variable to be chosen at the same
time as the line is constructed. The reliability of line (1,2) will be denoted by
17The unit of qi's and K is MW (megawatt), while the unit of Ci'S and P3 is $/MW (dollars
per megawatt).
18A line is congested when the power flowing on the line is just equal to the line capacity
19Reliability of a line is defined as the probability of the line being 'up'. The line is either
'up' or 'down'. The electricity cannot flow over a 'down' line.
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X12· The line connecting nodes 1 and 3 can also fail, but its reliability (X13) is
exogenously given.2o
2.4. The Socially Optimal Dispatch (Spot Pricing)
I start solving the problem backward in time. The problem of the system op-
erator is to choose the dispatch to maximize social surplus in each state of the
world, subject to power flow equations and the line constraint. Let's denote the
state of the world by the subscript ij = {{O, I}, {O, I}}where i denotes the state
of line (1, 2), and j denotes the state of line (1, 3), and 0 refers to the state of
a line being 'down'. For example, state 10 refers to line (1,2) being 'up', and
line (1,3) being 'down'. To simplify the notation, I will use the subscript only
for social welfare and the shadow value although all variables in the dispatching
problems must be state-dependent.
Then, the optimal dispatch problem for the system operator in state 11 (both
lines are 'up') is:
20Ifwe were to assume that all lines except (1,2) have perfect reliability (= 1), then we would
end up with a trivial problem when we decide on the capacity of line (1,2). When all other lines
are perfect, then a social planner never wants to have the line (1,2). Demand can be satisfied
by using the cheap generator at node 1 when we do not build line (1,2).
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subject to
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
Equation 2.1 establishes the equality of total power injection and power
usage, since there is assumed to be no transmission loss in the system. Equation
2.2 is the line constraint that limits the power fiOW21 between node 1 and node
2. We need this constraint only when the state of line (1,2) is 1 ('up'). We
have not listed the flow constraints for other lines, because we have already
assumed that their capacities are not binding (or arbitrarily large).Equation 2.3
refers to non-negativity constraints for power injections at node 1 and node 2,
respectively. We need the last two constraints because we have defined node 1
and node 2 as power-exporting nodes.
Let Aj(K) be the Lagrangian coefficient for line constraint. If j = 1, Aj(K)
refers to shadow value of line (1,2) when line (1,3) is 'up'. If j = 0, Aj(K)
refers to shadow value of line (1,2) when line (1,3) is 'down' .We put only one
21The relation between power flow and injections comes from the Kirchoff Laws. See the
appendix for a review of Kirchoff Laws.
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subscript for shadow value, because it is undefined in states where line (1,2) is
down. Assume that the parameters of the problem are such that a > C2. The
problem yields the following interior solution for the case of a congested line22 :
q = 2a-Cl -C2 + ~K1 4b 2' q = 2a-cl -C2 - ~K2 4b 2'
Then, the shadow value of the line constraint in state 11 is
The intuition behind the formula for the shadow value of the line is as follows:
If the line is congested (as we have assumed), then increasing the capacity of
the line by one unit allows the generation of ~ more units at node 1, and ~ less
units at node 2. The increase in SW is then equal to the total cost saving. 23
The shadow value of the line constraint in state 10 is
The formula is similar to the one in state 11, but it is simpler. In this case,
our network is reduced to a line (instead of the original triangle), hence there
22Interior solution refers to ql > a and q2 > O. A line is congested when the power flowing on
the line is just equal to the line capacity, i.e. P12 = K. Note that the dispatching problem is
solved for a given level of capacity.
23Note that the total benefit part of social welfare remains constant in this state. This
is because total generation, q3, remains the same when line capacity changes. The constant
marginal cost technology implies that the price of electricity at the demand node, P3, is constant
at P3 =~ when both generators are dispatched.
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are no loop flows to consider. When the line is congested and line (1,3) is down,
a unit increase in capacity of line (1,2) allows the dispatcher to generate 1 more
unit at node 1, and 1 less at node 2. The increase in SW is again equal to the
total cost saving. This is C2 - Cl = Ao(K), as claimed.
2.5. Choice of Capacity and Reliability
2.5.1. Social Planner's Problem
We will first examine the problem of choosing the socially optimal level of ca-
pacity and reliability so that it can be used as a benchmark to be compared
to choices by the monopolist line owner. The social planner's problem in the
case of positive capacity is to maximize the expected benefit of having line (1,2)
minus the cost of building it.
Max X12 y;'*(K) + (1 - X12) ~* - C(K, X12)
K, X12
where
v;.*(K) = X13SWtl(K) + (1 - X13)SWto(K) is the expected social surplus of
consuming and generating electricity evaluated at the optimal dispatch when
line (1,2) is 'up',
~* = X13SW;1 + (1 - X13)SW;o is the expected social surplus when line (1,2)
is 'down',
25
S~j is the social surplus in state ij, and
C(K, X12) is the cost of installing K MW of capacity with a reliability level
of X12· Assume C(O, X12) = 0, C1 > 0, C2 > 0, and C(K, X12) is strictly convex.
It is worth noting that ~* does not depend on the line capacity. This comes
from the fact that having a high- or low-capacity line does not make a difference
when the line is 'down'. Moreover, I treat the case of being 'down' the same as
the case of having no line24 , Le. K = 0.
The problem is intrinsically non-convex, making the solution non-standard.
There exists a discontinuity25 in the objective function at K = 0. This non-
convexity can be dealt with by comparing ~* with the objective function eval-
uated at the optimum positive level of capacity. If the former turns out to be
higher, then we choose K = °as the optimal capacity.
Let the expected shadow value, A, be defined as A = X13Al + (1 - X13)AO.
24This is another way of saying 'When the line breaks down, it is completely destroyed.'.
25In order to see that, compare the objective function when there is no line with the one
when there is an infinitesimal capacity. The former is just Vo*, while the latter is X12 Vt +
(1 - X12) VO* - C(K, X12). If we had lim ~* (K) = va*, there would not be a non-convexity.
K->O
However, this is not the case: whenever you put an infinitesimal capacity, the Kirchoff Laws
imply that you have to start running the expensive generator at node 2 in state 11. Moreover,
this change in the amount of power generated at node 2, Q2, is a jump from zero to 2a-~b-c2 •
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Then, the FOe's for an interior solution are:
K* : * ~ C (K* *) 0X 12 dK - 1 ,X12 = , or
(FOCk)
(FOC~)
The marginal benefit of capacity in equation FOCk is the shadow value
multiplied by its reliability, because the benefit of additional capacity is realized
only when the line is 'up'. In equation FOC~, the marginal benefit of increased
reliability is the difference between the expected social surplus when line (1,2)
is 'up', and when it is 'down' .26
The optimal capacity is K* (> 0) if the social welfare evaluated at K* is
higher than the social welfare evaluated at K = 0, Le. if
26We assume X13 is not too high to guarantee that marginal benefit of reliability is
non-negative. As X13 gets closer to 1 (perfect reliability), then a social planner always
chooses not to build a line between nodes 1 and 2. The critical value for X13 is X13 =
8Kb(C2-c I) Th £ < -
4(a-cI)2_(2a-cl-c2)2_4bK(C2-c I)' erelore, we assume X13 X13.
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2.5.2. The Line Owner's Problem
As we have mentioned in the section 1, the line owner earns revenue as a function
of installed capacity. The system operator pays the line owner K A(K) when
the line is 'up' and nothing when the line is 'down'. Hence, the expected shadow
value, A(K), is the price of capacity, and a price function that decreases with
capacity implies market power for the line owner.
The line owner chooses K and X12 to solve
Max X12(K A(K)) - C(K, X12)
K, X12
The FOC's for an interior solution are27:
Equation FOCf! is the usual MR=MC condition for a monopolist. The
marginal revenue of increasing capacity includes both the gain from the marginal
unit, and the loss due to decreased revenue for infra-marginal units. Equation
FOC;t shows that the marginal benefit of reliability is equal to the expected
27Note that the term :~ may have points of discontinuity. We will deal with this complication
later.
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total revenue when the line is 'up'.
2.6. Comparison
I will first present the usual under-investment result when reliability is held
constant. We only need to compare FOGs for capacity with a given level of
reliability. One can easily see that K M ::; K* (with reliability fixed) because
marginal benefit of the line owner has an extra term, X12KA', which is non-
positive. Since the cost function is the same for both the line owner and the social
planner, we get K M ::; K*. This is analogous to the behavior of a monopolist
who faces a downward-sloping demand curve for a single product. When A' < 0
(downward sloping demand curve), the monopolist under-invests in line capacity.
When A' = 0 (flat demand curve) the monopolist and the planner chooses the
same amount of capacity. Therefore, we obtain the under-investment result
when the shadow value of the line is strictly decreasing in capacity.
The next step is to check whether this result can be generalized to the case
when reliability is also a decision variable. I will use two methods to compare
the two sets of FOG's that I have presented. The first is an algebraic method
that uses a trick to make the set of FOGs comparable. The second method is
a graphical analysis of the FOG's on the capacity-reliability plane by using a
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specific functional form for the cost of line construction.
We can combine the problems of social planner and the monopolist into
one problem by using a parameter. This parameter, B E [0,1], measures the
relative importance of expected social welfare compared to expected revenue of
the monopolist line owner. Now we can write the 'combined'problem as
Max (I-B) (X12~*(K)+ (1 - X12)~* - C(K, X12))+B [X12KA(K) - C(K, X12)]
K, X12
where B = 0 refers to social planner's problem, and B
monopolist's problem.
1 refers to the
Since the cost function is the same for both, we can re-write the problem as
Max (1 - B) [X12~*(K) + (1 - X12)~*] + B(X12(K . A(K))) - C(K, X12)
K, X12
The FOes of the 'combined' problem are:
K : X12 (A(K) + BK;;) - C1(K, X12) = 0 (2.4)
X12 : (1 - B) (~*(K) - ~*) + BK A(K) - C2(K, X12) = 0 (2.5)
Note that we obtain the FOCs of the social planner's problem if we put B = 0,
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and the ones for the monopolist if we put (j = 1. If we take the total derivative
of the system of equations 2.4-2.5 , then we find how the choices of line capacity
and reliability are affected as () changes. This will let us compare the problems
of the social planner and the line owner. Simple algebra reveals28
dK _ (vt-Vo*-K >')(>'+0 K >.'-C12 )-C22 X12 K >.'
dO - C22(X12 >" (1+0)-Cl1 )+(>'+0 K >.'-C12)2
~ _ -(X12 >.'(1+0)-Cl1 ) (vt-Vo*-K >.)-(>.+0 K >.'-C12 ) X12 K >.'
dO - C22(X12 >.'(1+0)-Cl1 )+(>.+0 K >.'-C12 )2
(2.6)
(2.7)
Instead of deriving the complete set of solutions for this combined optimiza-
tion problem, our approach will be to determine some sufficient conditions in
order to get a couple of different results for ~~ and d~J2. The complete solution
requires a much more detailed analysis due to several reasons. First, there is
a discontinuity in the objective function at K = 0 as mentioned in the section
where we analyzed the social planner's problem. Second, >..'(K) does not exist
at some K values as we will explore later in more detail. Finally, reliability is
bounded between [0, 1], which increases the possibility of having corner solutions
in a complete solution.
Assume that the second-order conditions29 for both the line owner's and the
28Note that we have used >." = °in our derivation.
29The SOCs are GIl - (1 + B)X12>" > 0, G22 > 0, and
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social planner's problems hold. One can see that signs of ~~ and d~J2 depend on
the signs and the magnitudes of terms V';.* - ~* - K A and A+ () K A' - C12 . The
first term refers to the difference between the marginal benefit of reliability to
the social planner and that to the line owner. The second term is related to the
shape of the cost function. I will present some sufficient conditions that lead to
specific results for the comparison of investment by the social planner and the
line owner. But first, we need to obtain an intermediate result to be used in
propositions.
The next lemma shows that for some levels of capacity, the marginal benefit
of reliability for the social planner can never exceed that for the monopolist.
Lemma 1: V';.*(K) - ~* < KA for levels of capacity that imply a congested
line in state 11, and V';.*(K) - ~* > KA for levels of capacity that imply an
uncongested line only in states 10 and 11. That is, the marginal benefit of
reliability to the line owner exceeds that to the social planner for low levels of
capacity, and the reverse is true for high levels of capacity.
Proof: We will show the result directly by analyzing the behavior of V';.* (K)-
~* - K A for different levels of K. The set of values that line capacity can take is
C22 ( (1 + ())x>..' - C11 ) + (>" - 0 12 + ()K>..')2 < 0 at all values of K and X12 except where >..'(K)
is discontinous.
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composed of five critical intervals30 each of which corresponds to different func-
tions for Vt(K) and '\. In the first interval, expected shadow ~alue of capacity
is constant at a positive value. In the second interval, ,\ is decreasing with K,
but still positive. In the third interval, line (1,2) becomes uncongested in state
11, but still congested with a constant shadow value in state 10. In the fourth
interval, line (1,2) is still uncongested in state 11, but congested in state 10.
When K reaches interval five, the line is uncongested in both states, hence ex-
pected shadow value becomes zero. We can see the behavior of ,\ in figure 2 for
3DThese five intervals arise due to the solution of optimal dispatch problem (for given K)
mentioned in section 4. The dispatch solution in that section corresponds to capacity levels in
interval 1 in state 11. For each K in interval 1, price of electricity is constant due to constant
marginal cost of generation. The price becomes Cl !C2 in state 11, and C2 in state 10. In state
11, an additional unit of demand is optimally satisfied by using both generators. But in state
10, we can only use the expensive generator at node 2 in order to satisfy an additional unit of
demand. Since price is constant, quantity demanded also stays constant. All benefit due to a
unit increase in K comes from savings in total cost of generation by switching generation from
the expensive generator to the cheap one. Since marginal cost of generation is constant for both
generators, savings in total cost remain the same whatever the line capacity is. Hence, shadow
value of K is constant in this region.
But once line capacity enters interval 2, it becomes cheaper to dispatch only the cheap gener-
ator in state 11. Therefore, as line capacity increases (in region 2) more power is produced by
the cheap generator, and hence the price of electricity falls and quantity demanded increases.
But value of each additional capacity decreases as we increase capacity, because utility function
of electricity users is concave. Hence, A' < 0 in interval 2.
As we increase K further, there comes a point where additional capacity has no value to
society in state 11, but still has a constant value in state 10. This occurs when we enter interval
3, where Al = 0, and AD > O.
In interval 4, it becomes cheaper to use only the cheap generator in state 10 (similar to the
case in interval 2 for state 11). The value of an additional capacity gets smaller and smaller,
hence we end up with A' < 0 again.
In interval 5, the line becomes uncongested in both states. In other words, an additional
capacity has no longer any value to society. Then, expected shadow value, A, takes a value of
zero in this interval.
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X13 E (0, 1).
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Figure 2
4 5 K
Behavior of expected shadow value over five regions of line capacity
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Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the values taken by ~*(K), ~*, and .x, respectively,
over five intervals for capacity.
K Vi(K)
/ ( c] +cz) 2 \
1 o< K < 2a-c)-cZ X13 3:(C2- Cl)+ a- 2: +(1-X13)(K(C2-cd+(a~~z)Z)
- fib
\ J
2 2a-~b -C2 < K < ai~] X13 (3K (a - 3~K - Cl)) + (1- X13) (K(C2 - Cl) + (a~~2)Z)
3 a-c] < K < a-cz X13 Ca-;~d2) + (1 - X13) (K(C2 - Cl) + (a-;~z)Z)3b - b
4 a-C2 < K < a-c] X13 «a-;~1)2) + (1 - X13) (K(a - b{; - Cl))b - b
5 K > a-c] (a-CI)2
- b 2b
Table 1
Interval 1Ir*0
1
2
3 ((a-CI )2) (1 ) ((a-c2)2)X13 2b + - X13 2b
4
5
Table 2
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Interval ~
1 X13 (~(C2 - cd) + (1 - X13) (C2 - Cl)
2 X13 (3 (a - 3bK - cd) + (1 - X13) (C2 - Cl)
3 (1- X13) (C2 - Cl)
4 (1 -X13) (a- bJ( - Cl)
5 0
Table 3
Then, ~ = 11;.* (K) - ~* - K,.\ takes the following functional forms as given
in the next table.
Interval ~
1 X13;b(Cl - C2) (4a - 3Cl - C2) <0
2 X13 (3K (a - 3b.{ - Cl)) + (1- X13)K(C2 - Cl) - K,.\ <0
3 0 =0
4 (1 - X13) (bK2 _ (a-~2)2) >0
5 (1 ) ((a-CI )2 (a- c2)2) >0- X13 -2-b- - -2-b-
Table 4
We also present a graph showing the behavior of Vt(K) - ~* and K,.\ as K
varies in Figure 3.
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Line Capacity
In intervall, we can re-write ~ as ib(Cl - C2) (2a - Cl - C2 + 2(a - Cl)) . But
we know from an earlier assumption in section 3 that 2a - Cl - C2 > 0, hence
a - Cl > O. Therefore, ~ < 0 in interval l.
In interval 2, note that ~ is an increasing function of K. Then, let's evaluate
~ at the lower and upper limits of interval 2. At K = 2a-~~-c2 , ~ becomes
21b (C) ;C2) (2a - 3C1ic2) < O. At K = a;~], ~ becomes O. Since 'E is a strictly
increasing function in this interval, we conclude that ~ < 0 in interval 2. There-
fore, ~* (K) - ~* - K).. < 0 in intervals land 2 (or when the line is congested
in state 11).
The sign of ~ changes after interval 3. In intervals 4 and 5, ~* (K) - ~* - K).. >
O.•
This result is surprising, but makes sense. As a very crude intuition, one can
see that the social planner attaches a positive value to the state when the line is
down (or when the line is not built), but the line owner does not. When the line
is not built (or if it fails), the electricity can still go through other lines on the
network to serve the demand, hence society gets some positive value even when
the line is down (or absent). Moreover, from the point of view of the planner,
term K).. is analogous to total expenditure, and term ~* (K) is analogous to
total utility of consumers in a market with a downward-sloping demand curve.
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In such a setting, total expenditure is always less than total utility, because some
consumers' willingness to pay for the good exceeds the market price. Then, K >..
is always less than 11;.* (K). But since society gets a surplus of ~* when K = 0,
the sign of ~*(K) - ~* -K>" depends on whether ~*(K) -K)" (> 0) exceeds ~*.
As K increases, Vt (K) - K).. gets larger. Therefore, for low levels of capacity,
the value of additional reliability for the social planner is less than the one for
the monopolist.
One might gain more intuition for the result by considering the functional
form of ~* (K). In the first interval, shadow value is constant (as shown and ex-
plained before). Therefore, ~*(K) must be composed of a term linear in K, and
another one independent of K. The first term must be K >..( K), which is nothing
but the total revenue of the line owner. The second term must be less than ~*
(social welfare when the line is not built, or when the line is not congested),
because as capacity reaches zero we have a positive jump in social welfare. This
is the form of non-convexity in the problem as we mentioned before. Therefore,
1I;.*(K) - ~* must be less than K>..(K) in interval 1. In the second interval,
shadow value is decreasing in capacity, hence the first term (which depends
on K) in 11;.* (K) (which is now increasing at a decreasing rate as K changes)
must be greater than K>"(K). Then, V';.*(K) - ~* must be approaching K>"(K)
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in this region. It never exceeds K)"(K) , because these terms are equalized at
zero when we reach the third interval. In this interval, SWll = SW01 and
(1 - X13) (SWlO - SWoo ) = K).., since).. is constant. When we reach interval 4,
shadow value of line in state 11 is zero, and shadow value in state 10 is decreas-
ing in K. Therefore, "V;.*(K) - ~* term must be increasing at a decreasing rate,
and hence v;.*(K) - ~* -K)" must be greater than zero. In interval 5, value of an
additional capacity is zero in both states 11 and 10. Therefore, Vt(K) - ~* - K)..
simply reduces to the difference in social welfare of states 10 and 00. But when
line (1,3) fails, having line (1,2) results in a greater value for social welfare com-
pared to not having it. As a result, Y;.* (K) - ~* - K).. is greater than zero in
interval 5.
Now we can present our results comparing K* and K M . We assume that
there exists an interior solution to the combined optimization problem for all ().
Our first result presents a sufficient condition for the line owner to over-invest
in line capacity and line reliability.
Proposition 1: If the cost function is such that the cross-cost elasticity31 is
31The cross-cost elasticity measures the responsiveness of the marginal cost of capacity to a
change in reliability. When it is greater than unity, a one percent increase in reliability increases
the marginal cost of capacity by more than one percent.
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less than unity32, Le. ~C12 < 1, and if both K* and K M fall into interval 133 ,
then the monopolist chooses a higher level of capacity and reliability compared
to the social planner, or ~~ > 0 and d~~2 > O.
Proof: Assume ~C12 < 1. Since K* and K M fall into interval 1 for capacity,
A' = O. Hence, A+BK A' - C12 = A - C12> A - i2L. But we know from equationX12
2.4 that at an interior optimum in interval 1, X12A - C1 = 0, or A - QL = O.X12
Therefore, A - C12 > 0 at an interior optimum in interval 1.
Since K* and K M fall into interval 1 for capacity, we know from Lemma 1
that ~* - ~* - K A < O.
Now we can analyze the signs of ~ and d;;'l/. The numerator of ~ becomes
negative, since A' = 0 in this interval. Moreover, the numerator of ~~2 becomes
negative.
The denominators of both ~~ and d~~2 are nothing but the negative of the
SOC of the combined problem. Since we assume the SOCs hold at the optimum,
32This assumption is satisfied by some cost functions such as C(K, X12) = AKa: + Bxf2 (for
a 2: 2; f3 2: 2; A, B > 0), and C(K, X12) = AKa:(l - X12)-f3(for a 2: 2; 0 < /3 < 1; A > 0).
However, the assumption is not satisfied for functions of the form C(K, X12) = KX12 eKX12
(elasticity being greater than one), or of the form C(K, X12) = AKa:x f2 (for a 2: 2, f3 > 1,
A> 0).
330ne can obtain K* and K M in interval 1 (for capacity) if marginal cost of capacity is high
enough. This is a matter of multiplying the cost function with a large parameter (without
causing a corner solution at K = 0), which would not affect any of our assumptions about the
cost function. Whether marginal cost of capacity is high enough or not is an empirical question,
which is outside the scope of this paper.
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or C22 (X12 ""(1+8)-Cl1 )+("'+0 K ""-C12 )2 < 0, the signs of both denominators
are negative.
Therefore, we get ~~ > 0 and d~J2 > 0 as claimed.•
This result proves that the under-investment result found in the literature
cannot be generalized to cases where line reliability is also an endogenous vari-
able. It is possible to have over-investment in capacity and reliability under the
conditions mentioned in the proposition.
Some intuition for the result can be gained by remembering that the marginal
benefit of reliability for the line owner exceeds that of the social planner in
interval 1. Moreover, the marginal benefit of capacity for both the line owner
and the social planner in interval 1 is determined by the same formula, since
the shadow value is constant in this interval. Therefore, for a given level of
capacity, the line owner chooses a higher level of reliability compared to the
social planner. But then, a higher level of reliability implies an upward shift in
the marginal benefit of capacity and marginal cost of capacity in the line owner's
problem compared to the social planner's problem. Since we assumed the cross-
cost elasticity being less than one, an increase in reliability does not increase
the marginal cost of reliability much. Therefore, the increase in the marginal
cost of capacity (due to an increase in reliability) is less than the increase in
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the marginal benefit of capacity. This implies that the line owner will choose a
higher level of capacity compared to the social planner.
We can see how the proposition works by showing the FOCs on a K - X12
plane. The first step is to find the slopes of each FOC. One can easily verify
that the slopes are
FoeS ~ = X12,X'-C11 (2.8)K dK c l2 -,x
FoeS ~ = 'x-C12 (2.9)x dK C 22
FoeM ~ = C ll -2x12'x' (2.10)K dK ,X+K,X'-C12
FoeM ~ = ,X+K,X'-C12 (2.11)x dK C22
(Note that we have used the fact that A" = 0 in order to obtain equation
2.10.)
The signs of equations 2.8-2.11 depend on the sign of ,X + ()K,X' - C 12 for
() = 0, 1. Moreover, one condition in Proposition 1 is related to the cross-cost
elasticity, ~C12. Therefore, we will illustrate the proposition by using a specific
cost function that yields known values for the terms ~C12 and ,X+()K,X' - e12 .
The next example analyzes the problem by using a specific cost function.
Example 1: Assume the cost of building a transmission line with capacity
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K and reliability X12 takes the following functional form:
(for A, B ».
This separable cost function implies C12 = ~C12 = a.Therefore, the signs
of the slopes of FOes depend on the term A + BKA'. For the social planner's
problem, we have B = 0, hence the sign of A determines the signs of equations
2.8 and 2.9. Since A > 0 in intervals 1 through 4, and A = 0 in interval 5, FOCk
and FOC~ are upward sloping in intervals 1 through 4, and FOC~ is flat in
interval 5. FOCk is not defined in interval 5.34 Moreover, FOC~ is not defined
whenever Vt - Vo* < 0.35
The monopolist's problem corresponds to B = 1, hence the sign of A + KA'
determines the signs of equations 2.10 and 2.11. Since A' ::; 0, the sign of A+K A'
in intervals 1 through 4 depends on the parameters of the spot-pricing problem.
Assume X13 < 3 c24-c~ to make sure that A+K A' > 0 in interval 2, and assume36
a- Cl C2
a > 2C2 - Cl so that A+ KA' < a in interval 4. In interval 5, A+ KA' = a. Under
these assumptions, FOCt! and FOC!: are upward sloping in interval 1 through
3. FOC!: is downward sloping in interval 4, but FOCt! is not defined in this
34 A = °makes the marginal benefit part of FOCf<: equal to zero. But C1 = 3AK2 > °in
interval 5, therefore FOCy< is not defined in this interval.
35Note that Vt(K) - VO* is negative at K = 0, and it is an increasing function of K. Therefore,
FOC; will be undefined for small values of K,but will be defined for larger values of K.
36If we had assumed a < 2C2 - Cl, then A+ K A' would have become positive for small K in
interval 4, and negative for the remaining values in the same interval.
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interva1.37 Neither FOCt! nor FOC~ are defined in interval 5.
We can see a summary of the behavior of FOCs in Table 5.
Interval FOCs FOCs FOCt! FOC MK x x
1
2 Increasing Increasing Increasing Increasing
3
4 Does not hold Decreasing
5 Does not hold Horizontal Does not hold Does not hold
Table 5
The next step is to compare the FOCs in a pairwise manner so that we
can determine their relative positions on an K - X12 plane. FOCl< and FOCt!
coincides in intervals 1 and 3 (since X becomes zero), and FOCt! makes a
positive j ump38 between intervals 1 and 2.
37Note that A+KA' < 0 in interval 4 means that the marginal benefit part in FOCt! becomes
negative. Since the marginal cost of capacity is non-negative, FOCt! is not defined in interval
4.
380ne can see this by re-writing FOCt! as A + K A' = C1 (K, X12) / X12. As !{ increases
infinitesimally at K = 2a -~b-C2 (or moving from interval 1 to interval 2), A + K A' decreases
discontinuously due to the jump in A'. Since C1 is a continuous function of K and X12, we must
observe a discontinuous increase or decrease in Xl2 so that the FOe is still satisfied. To see the
direction of change in X12, we need to look at 8:12 (C1(K, X12) / X12). It turns out that this
derivative is equal to ~ (~C12 - 1) . If ~C12 < 1(or cross-cost elasticity being less than
x 12 1 1
unity), then X12 needs to increase discontinuously to compensate for the jump in A+ K A'.
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Comparison of FOe~ and FOe!: reveals that they coincide in interval 3
(since \!;*(K) - \!Q* = KA in this interval). For a given K in interval 1, FOC~
implies a lower X12 compared to FOC~, because V';.*(K) - \!Q* < KA in this
interval.
Finally, FOCk is steeper than FOC~ (when they intersect), and FOet! is
steeper than FOe!: (when they intersect) due to the assumed SOCs.
In the light of this analysis, we can now illustrate Proposition 1 in figure 4.
The graph is generated by using the following parameter values:
a = 110, b = 0.2 : the inverse demand function for electricity implies a
maximum price of $110, and it has a slope of -0.2. (Note that b = 0 corresponds
to a perfectly elastic demand function.)
Cl = 10, C2 = 40 : the marginal cost of generation is $10 at node 1, and $40
at node 2.
X13 = 0.8636 : the probability of failure in line (1, 3) is 86.36%.
A = 0.0002, B = 6500 : cost of line capacity is multiplied by 0.0002, and cost
of line reliability is multiplied by 9000.
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The thick lines on figure 4 represent the FOes of the social planner, and the
thin lines represent the FOGs of the monopolist. The dashed lines refer to the
FOGs for reliability, and the solid lines refer to the FOGs for capacity.
The figure shows that the optimal capacity choices of both the planner and
the line owner falls into interval 1 under the assumptions made earlier. 39 As we
can see on the figure, the monopolist chooses a higher capacity (KM > K*) and
higher reliability (x~ > Xi2) compared to the social planner. (End of Example
1).
The next proposition sets a sufficient condition for the line owner to choose
first-best levels of capacity and reliability.
Proposition 2: If both K* and K M fall into interval 3, then the line owner
chooses the first-best levels of capacity and reliability, or ~~ = d~J2 = O.
Proof: Since K* and K M fall into interval 3, >..'(K) = O. Moreover, Vt -
~* - K>.. = 0 since we are in interval 3. This implies that the numerators of
both equations 2.6 and 2.7 become zero. Therefore, ~~ = d~~2 = 0 as claimed.•
39The reader can see that FOCk and FOC~ intersects twice (both in interval 1). However,
only one of them corresponds to the global optimum. To see that, we check the value of the SOC
for the social planner's problem. The SOC takes a value of C22 ((XA' -CU )+(A-C12 )2 ~ +500 >
o at the first intersection, and it takes a value of about -400 < 0 at the second intersection.
Therefore, the SOC is only satisfied at the second intersection, which gives us the unique global
optimum.
Similarly, FOCt! and FOC!: coincide twice (both in interval 1). The first intersection occurs
at point (0,0) on the K - X12 plane, but the SOC is not satisfied at this point. The second
intersection satisfies the SOC, hence it is the unique global optimum.
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Note that interval 3 is where the marginal benefit of reliability for the line
owner is equalized to that for the social planner for a given level of capacity.
Moreover, the marginal benefit of capacity is the same for both the social planner
and the line owner, since the shadow value is constant. This implies the result,
because the set of FOCs are the same for both of them.
This proposition deserves attention due to two reasons. First, it gives another
set of conditions under which the under-investment result does not hold. Second,
it shows that an unregulated line owner might choose the first-best levels of
capacity and reliability. If we know that capacity choices are going to be in
interval 3, then we do not need to regulate either capacity nor reliability.
We will illustrate this result by an example on a K - XI2 plane as we did for
Proposition 1. The next example sets the assumptions on functional forms and
parameters in order to illustrate Proposition 2.
Example 2: Since we have not employed any assumption for cross-cost
elasticity in Proposition 2, we can pick any cost function for line construction
that satisfies the sacs. We pick w.l.o.g. that the cost function is the same as
in Example 1. Therefore, C(K, X12) = A K 3 + B Xi2·
Assume again that XI3 < 3 c24-c~ to make sure that A+ K)'" > 0 in interval 2,
a- Cl C2
and assume a > 2C2 - CI so that).. +K)'" < 0 in interval 4. Then, the shapes and
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slopes of FOCs will be the same as in Figure 4. We will only change parameters
of the cost function for line construction to illustrate Proposition 2. Hence, the
parameters are assumed to take the following values:
a = 110, b = 0.2, Cl = 10, C2 = 40, X13 = 0.8636, and
A = 0.00006, B = 9000.
Figure 5 shows the FOCs implied by these parameters.
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As in Figure 4, the thick lines refer to the FOCs for the social planner's
problem, and the dashed lines refer to the FOCs for reliability. The FOCs of
the social planner's problem and the FOCs of the monopolist's problem intersect
in interval 3. Since the set of FOCs are the same for both the social planner
and the line owner in this interval, they choose the same amount of capacity
and reliability. (End of Example 2).
The next proposition presents a sufficient condition for obtaining the under-
investment in capacity and over-investment in reliability.
Proposition 3: If the cost function is such that the cross-cost elasticity is
greater than unity, and if both K* and K M fall into the same interval in one of
intervals 1 or 2, then the line owner chooses under-investment in capacity and
over-investment in reliability, or ~~ < 0 and d~~2 > O.
Proof: Assume ~C12 > 1, then A+OK A' - C 12 < 0 at the optimum. Since
K* and K M fall into one of intervals 1 or 2, 11;.* - ~* - K A < O. These observations
imply that the numerator of equation 2.6 will be positive, and the numerator of
equation 2.7 will be negative. Since both denominators are negative, then we
obtain ~~ < 0 and d~J2 > 0 as claimed.•
Example 3: Assume that the cost fUIlction takes the form C = A (K +
Ko)2 xi25. Hence, the cross-cost elasticity becomes ~C12 = ~ > 1. In order to
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get both K* and K M in interval 1, we assume the parameters take the following
values:
a = 110, b = ~, Cl = 10, C2 = 30, X13 = 0.1, and
A =~, Ko = 10.
Figure 6 shows the FOes implied by these parameters.
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The thick lines refer to the FOGs for the social planner's problem, and the
dashed lines refer to the FOGs for reliability. We dropped the labels for FOGs
to improve the visibility of intersections. As claimed in Proposition 3, when the
cross-cost elasticity is greater than unity and both K* and K M fall into interval
1, the line owner over-invests in line reliability (xM > Xi2), and under-invests in
line capacity (KM < K*). (End of Example 3)
2.7. Conclusion
We have analyzed the incentives of a monopolist line owner in choosing the line
capacity and line reliability. The common idea that the line owner invests too
little in order to maximize the congestion rent does not always hold true when
reliability is also a choice variable.
We present a couple of sufficient conditions each of which leads to a different
result regarding the investment choices of the line owner and the social planner.
The conditions are based on the cross-cost elasticity of line construction and
on the interval in which the optimal choices of capacity take place. The first
result finds that the line owner over-invests in both capacity and reliability if
the elasticity is less than unity and if capacity choices of the social planner and
the line owner are not too high. Another result shows that we get the first-best
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levels of capacity and reliability from the line owner if the optimal choices of
capacity fall into an interval where the set of FOes are the same for the social
planner and the line owner. Finally, we present a sufficient condition that yields
under-investment in capacity.
Therefore, under the reward mechanism analyzed in this paper, regulation of
both capacity and reliability is in general better than leaving those decisions to
market forces. 'Natural Transmission Revenue' mechanism (which sets shadow
value of line as its price) does not necessarily result in under-investment in line
capacity. We are aware of the fact that regulation by itself has a cost to society
due to administrative expenses and due to cost arising from asymmetric infor-
mation. Hence, empirical studies are needed to compare regulatory mechanisms
with decentralized mechanisms.
Our results indicate the need for empirical studies to determine the shape of
the function that relates the cost of providing capacity and reliability in trans-
mission networks. An estimate of the cost function together with a simulation
analysis for modeling the spot pricing of electricity (and hence the shadow value
of capacity) will determine which of our conditions hold true for different net-
works.
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3. REGULATION
REGULATION OF TRANSMISSION LINE INVESTMENT AND
RELIABILITY
3.1. Introduction
Successful deregulation of electric power industry requires open and fair access
to the transmission network. Attention has focused on transmission pricing
issues but an equally important long-term issue is the design of a market and
regulatory framework which induces owners to make optimal investments in
network capacity and reliability. This is the topic of this paper.
Reliability of electric power used to be seen as an exogenous variable by
planners4o • It was determined using engineering rules, which were viewed as
constraints by the decision-making authority41. However, reliability should be
40The only exception that I aware of is an experimental project by Duke Power Company.
This project aims to perform planning activities by taking into account the value of reliability
to their customers. See Dalton et al [7] for details.
41See Munasinghe [15], p. 24 for a more detailed treatment of the current approach to relia-
bility. An example of these exogenous constraints is the N-l rule, or first contingency criterion.
It requires that if one component fails, the others must be sufficient to serve the demand. An-
other example is the practice (in Brazil) of putting a direct constraint on reliability, saying that
demand must be served 95 % of the time. See Dalton et. al. [7} p. 1400, and Nasser [16] p. 38..
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chosen on the basis of economic principles as well, taking into account not only
engineering principles but also the preferences of electricity users and the cost of
reliability. The materials42 and technology43 used in the construction of trans-
mission lines, the level of maintenance expenditures, and the transmission ca-
pacity of lines constitute the major determinants of the reliability for the whole
network44 . In this paper, reliability of a line is considered as a choice variable
for the investor who constructs the line. The optimal regulation of a monopolist
firm choosing reliability and capacity of the line is formulated.
For the structure of ownership and control rights of the transmission net-
work, there are two basic alternatives in the literature. The first one involves
the regulation of the line owner(s). The second alternative is to leave the in-
421 will only mention two examples. First, either rod gaps or surge arresters can be used to
protect transformers, reactors, and other components from overvoltages; rod gaps are cheaper,
but also less reliable. Second, transmission line poles can be made from wood, steel or concrete;
wood is cheaper but can be less reliable. (From the Encyclopedia of Physical Science and
Technology [8])
43For example, a new technology called FACTS allows the operator to automatically re-
distribute flow when the power flowing on a line reaches its limit. Such a technology enables
the system operator to prevent line breakdowns and repair costs due to overflows. Installing
FACTS definitely improves reliability, but at an extra cost.
44The formation of reliability coordinating councils (e.g. North American Electric Reliabil-
ity Council, NERC) by electric utilities was motivated by the need for operating and design
standards for the industry. The existence of these institutions indicates that investors have a
multitude of options affecting the reliability of the system. Even under this coordinated struc-
ture of the industry, electric utilities do not always conform to those standards. As a senior
transmission planner said: "We have a line I would like to monitor, but I do not think we
would like the results." Another quote: "A district engineer, after being informed that a copper
conductor was annealed and had lost most of its strength, said, "I do not think we can afford
to replace it this year." (From Electrical World [20], p.18).
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vestment decision to a decentralized market mechanism. The most prominent
model for the latter (by Bushnell and Stoft [4]) uses the instrument of Transmis-
sion Congestion Contracts (TCC)45 in order to give the right incentives to line
owners for investment. The study assumes there are many potential investors
who are free to make expansions to any line on the network subject to some
rules that determine the reward for investments. Their basic idea is to let the
investor choose any set of TeC's over the network under one condition: the new
aggregate set of TCC's must imply a feasible46 dispatch. The system achieves
the socially optimum investment under quite restrictive assumptions, such as
the exact match of contracts to the actual dispatch at all times. Moreover, the
lumpiness of line investment is not captured in their analysis.
Holding reliability fixed, the line owner is likely to choose under-investment
to increase congestion rents even when the spot-pricing of electricity is done
optimally47. Nasser [16] uses a particular reward function, called Natural Trans-
45TCC's were introduced by Hogan [10]. A TCC is defined for a pair of nodes (i,j), and
gives its owner a prespecified quantity multipled by the difference in prices at node i and j.
Nodes specified in the contract are not necessarily connected in physical terms. Hence, a TCC
is essentially a financial instrument rather than a certificate to have the right to transfer electric
power from node i to j.
A variant of this approach will be used by New York Power Authority (NYPA). Investors who
pay for transmission expansion will receive TCC's as compensation.
46A dispatch is feasible if it does not violate the constraints of the dispatching problem, such
as line flow constraints, the constraint for the conservation of power, etc.
47See Nasser [16] p. 175, and Bushnell and Stoft [3].
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mission Revenue48 , for the line owner in order to show the under-investment
result with exogenous reliability. I have shown in Celebi [5] that (when relia-
bility as well is a choice variable) the owner might invest too little or too much
capacity depending on the cross-cost elasticity of line construction with respect
to capacity and reliability. If the marginal cost of capacity is very sensitive to a
marginal increase in reliability, then the monopolist chooses too much capacity
and too little reliability compared to the socially optimal levels. The common
result of both studies is the need for regulation.
The regulation alternative is studied in Nasser [16], which formulates the
optimal regulation of a monopolist firm owning all the lines in the network.
The study considers only capacity as the decision variable, ignoring the firm's
ability to affect the reliability of a line. Moreover, Nasser [16] does not question
the existence of lines, and implicitly assumes that it is to the benefit of society
to have all the lines on the network. However, in the absence of line failures,
some lines on the network may be either detrimental to social welfare, or just
redundant. My analysis shows that the existence of a line is justified when the
reliability of other lines on the network is not too high. Another result relates
48Natural Transmission Revenue is the shadow value of line capacity multiplied by the ca-
pacity. It is "natural" in the sense that shadow value represents the true value of the marginal
capacity to society.
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the decision to build a line to the marginal cost of the expensive generator. As
the marginal cost gets higher, the regulator is more likely to build the line under
some conditions. I further argue that the expectation of higher demand in the
future makes the regulator less likely to build the line if it will be congested
and reliability of other lines is high enough. Finally, I analyze whether it is
socially optimal to have a non-congested line under complete and incomplete
information structures. It is always optimal to have a congested line under
complete information, but that result does not always hold under incomplete
information.
The plan of the paper is as follows. I will describe the institutional setting,
and the technology of electricity transmission in the next two sections. The
fourth section shows how spot pricing is done and explains the shadow price of
line capacity, which will be used in the analysis of investment. Regulation is
analyzed in section five, followed by the conclusion.
3.2. Institutional Set-up
The spot pricing of electricity is assumed to follow nodal pricing as introduced
by Schweppe et. al. [18]49, and used by Hogan [10]. A system operator organizes
49See Schweppe et. al. [18], pp. 151-156 for their nodal pricing model.
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auctions in which demand and supply bids of users yield the price of electricity
at each node of the network. The nodal pricing model not only is the present
paradigm of choice of policy makers (as in New England and U.K.) but its
optimality relies on far less restrictive assumptions than its principal rival5o .
The basic assumption in the nodal pricing model is the absence of market power
among users and suppliers of electricity, while the decentralized market model
also requires the absence of market power among the owners of transmission
lines. Since the focus of the study will be on long-term decisions of investment
and reliability, I will ignore the imperfections in the spot pricing of electricity.
I aim to formulate the optimal regulation of investment and reliability, rather
than analyzing the interactions between the market imperfections in the spot
pricing and the imperfections in investment and reliability choice.
For the structure of ownership and control rights of the transmission network,
the line owner is assumed to be regulated. Economies of scale51 in line construc-
tion and highly concentrated ownership patterns in most countries52 make this a
more plausible alternative than the decentralized investment systems proposed
50The alternative is a decentralized pricing system, such as the tradable physical rights ap-
proach by Chao and Peck (6].
51See Baldick-Kahn [2] for more details on the technology of line construction.
52A few utility companies jointly own most of the regional transmission networks in many
states of the U.S. In the U.K, there is a single transmission company, called the National Grid
Company (NGC).
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in the literature. Moreover, the regulation of a single line owner was hinted at
by Bushnell and Stoft [4]53, and was analyzed by Nasser [16].
The choice of line reliability determines the probability of being in one of
the two states of the world: either the line works or it fails. I assume that
the system operator and users learn the state of the world before the auction
for spot pricing is organized. However, investment and reliability decisions are
made before the state of the world is known. This is the natural way of timing,
because investment decisions are generally made much less frequently than pric-
ing decisions54 . The regulator offers a contract to the firm (before the decision
on investment and reliability) on the basis of observable variables. At the time
of writing the contract, the regulator does not know the firm's type and the
level of cost-reducing activities of the firm. We can think of the type of firm
as a measure of its productivity, which is exogenous. 55 Cost-reducing activities,
or effort, represent any managerial effort or maintenance activity that is not
observable to anyone other than the firm itself.
53They said, "Transmission assets could be combined into a single entity that would have to
be closely regulated due to its substantial market power." (Bushnell and Stoft [4], p. 90)
54In practice, auctions are held hourly, but investment decisions take place once in a couple
of years.
55An alternative interpretation of the firm's type is its ability to access state-of-the-art tech-
nology of line construction and materials. This case may arise when construction firms are
also involved in developing the technology of line construction. A firm can find itself in a rel-
atively advantageous position compared to others once it completes the development of a new
technology.
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I assume perfect competition among users (or bidders) of electricity in auc-
tions that determine spot prices, hence pricing is done optimally. Optimal prices
yield the shadow price of the line, which is the value to the society of a mar-
ginal unit of capacity evaluated at optimal spot prices. Instead of rewarding
the firm by the shadow price per unit of capacity, I consider a more general
transfer which is a function of observable variables when the line is built, and
zero when the line is not built. The only observable variables to the regulator
are capacity, reliability and total cost. One might be surprised that the firm is
paid a transfer even when the line is 'down'. But it should also be kept in mind
that the regulator has the option of paying less for low reliability levels, hence
there is no need to devise a different transfer function for the case of a 'down'
line.
Before proceeding to the economic analysis, I will present the power tech-
nology in a simplified network model in the next section.
3.3. A Simple Model of Electric Networks
The model used in this analysis will be the DC load approximation to the power
flow with no line loss. The network will be assumed to have three nodes, which
are connected by identical transmission lines in a triangular shape. Voltage levels
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throughout the network are assumed to be held constant. Figure 1 illustrates
the triangular network.
Nodes 1 and 2 are generator nodes, while node 3 is the demand node. Gen-
eration (or injection) by generator 1 and generator 2 are labeled ql and q2,
respectively, while the consumption at node 3 is labeled q3 . Power flowing on
line (i, j) from node i to node j is ~j. Assume that only line (1,2), with a
line capacity of K, has the possibility of congestion. Moreover, the reliability
of line (1,2) is a decision variable to be chosen at the same time as the line is
constructed. Reliability of a line is defined as the probability of the line being
'up'. The line is either 'up' or 'down', and the electricity cannot flow over a
'down' line. The reliability of line (1,2) is denoted by X12. The line connecting
nodes 1 and 3 has a possibility of being 'down' too. However, its reliability,
X13, is exogenous56 for decision makers, and independent of the reliability of line
56This assumption is made to keep the model simple, and to be able to see the role of line
(1,2) in satisfying the demand at node 3 when line is (1,3) 'down'.
If it were not exogenous, our set-up would imply that building a line between nodes 1 and 2
may be inferior to just increasing the reliability of existing line (1,3). Both alternatives improve
the reliability of system, but the first one brings the disadvantage of having to use the expensive
generator in the case of congestion. Hence, the second alternative (just increasing the reliability
of line (1,3)) is better than having an additional line between nodes 1 and 2 (assuming that
an improvement in reliability costs less than building an additional line). However, the first
alternative is viable if the construction cost between nodes 1 and 2 is less than the cost between
nodes 1 and 3 (This might be due to a difference in distance, or difference in environmental
costs, etc.). The first alternative is again viable if line (1,2) is needed in order to diversify risk
in case of climate shocks to transmission lines. As a result, I will concentrate on choosing the
reliability of one line to be able to isolate the trade off between congestion and reliability.
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(1,2).
Assume that generators have increasing marginal cost production technolo-
gies with c~ (qr) = ql and C~(q2) = mq2, respectively, where m > 1. That is,
we assume that the marginal cost of generator 1 is less than the marginal cost
of generator 2 for each generation level except zero. Assume the inverse de-
mand function at node 3 is P3(q3) = a - bq3, with the implied utility function of
3.4. The Socially Optimal Dispatch (Spot Pricing)
I start solving the problem backward in time. The problem of the system op-
erator is to choose the dispatch to maximize social surplus in each state of the
world, subject to power flow equations and the line constraint with a given ca-
pacity. Denote the state of the world by rs, where rand s take two values, 0
and 1. That is, 00 refers to the state when both line (1,2) and line (1,3) are
'down', 01 refers to the state when line (1,2) is down, and line (1,3) is 'up', so
on. To simplify the notation, I will use a state subscript only for social welfare
and the shadow price, although all variables in the dispatching problems must
be state-dependent.
57The unit of q's and K is MW (megawatt), while the unit of c's and P3 is $/MW (dollars
per megawatt).
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Then, the optimal dispatch problem for the system operator in state 11 is:
subject to
(3.1)
(3.2)
Equation 3.1 establishes the equality of total power injection and power
usage, since there is assumed to be no transmission loss in the system. The
constraint 3.2 is the line constraint58 that limits the power flow between node
1 and node 2. When the state is 01, then constraint 3.2 is not needed, and the
optimal value of the objective function becomes SWQ1. In state 10, the constraint
3.2 reduces to ql :::; K, because all power injected at node 1 goes through line
(1,2). The optimal value for this state is SWlO . In state 00, the demand node
is essentially disconnected from generator 1, hence only the more expensive
58The formula for the power flow is a result of Kirchoff Laws, which states that power coming
to an intersection divides itself in inverse proportion to the relative resistance of paths. That is,
more power flows on a path which has less resistance than others.
In our simple network (with identical lines), a unit power injection from node 1 causes a 1/3
unit power flow from node 1 to node 2 on line (1,2). Similarly, a unit injection from node 2
causes a 1/3 unit flow from node 2 to node 1 on line (1,2). The net flow is their difference.
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generator can be used. The solution of the optimization problem at ql = 0, and
no line constraint yields SWOO .59
Let Ai be the Lagrangian coefficient for the constraint 3.2 in state Ii (i
0,1)60, The problem yields the following set of FOe's in state 11:
The first equation demonstrates the necessary condition for the optimal in-
jection from node 1. The marginal social cost of a unit injection is the sum of
the marginal cost of generation and the cost of congestion created due to this
injection, Each unit of injection at node 1 requires 1/3 units of capacity on line
(1,2), which has a marginal benefit of Al to the society. Marginal benefit of in-
jection on the LHS is the price of electricity that consumers at node 3 pay. The
second equation is similar to the first one, except this one is for the injection at
node 2. The injection at node 2 relieves the congestion of line (1,2), hence the
social marginal cost is reduced by one-third of AI. The optimal solution for a
d 1, ( h K a(m-l)) ,congeste Ine were < 3(m+b+bm) IS:
_ 2a+3K(2b+m)
ql - 4b+l+m '
_ 2a-3K(2b+l)
q2 - 4b+l+m '
_ 4a+3K(m-l)
q3 - 4b+l+m ' P
_ a(1+m)-3bK(m-l)
3 - 4b+l+m
59Results for each state of the world are in Appendix.
60Note that we are not introducing any notation for the state when line (1,2) is down, because
the shadow value is not defined when the line is not there.
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Then, the shadow price of the line constraint becomes
A = 3(p - c' (q )) = 3 (a(m-l)-3K(m+b+bm))
1 3 1 1 4b+l+m
The intuition behind the formula for the shadow price of the line is as follows:
The generator at node 1 has to pay $~ for each unit of injection, because only
1/3 of that injection flows on line (1,2). On top of that, the generator incurs a
marginal generation cost of C~(ql). The benefit of that injection is the marginal
benefit to consumers, P3. Optimality requires marginal benefit being equal to
marginal cost at the margin, which gives us the formula for the shadow price.
When the line constraint 3.2 is not binding, the optimal dispatch is such that
marginal cost of generators are equalized, that is ql = mq2. Note that ql < mq2
when the constraint 3.2 is binding, that is when the line is congested.
Now we know the optimal dispatch and shadow price for each state of the
world and for each level of capacity. The complete solution and a numerical
example is given in the Appendix. The next step is to choose the capacity and
the reliability of the line, and we will use a model based on the analysis in
Laffont and Tirole61 [13].
61See Chapter 3, page 168 for their analysis.
70
3.5. Regulation of Capacity and Reliability
3.5.1. The Model
The monopolist firm chooses the capacity, K, and reliability level, X12, of the
transmission line connecting nodes 1 and 2 on the triangular network.
The firm incurs a cost which depends on the type of firm, on the cost-reducing
effort level, on the transmission capacity of the line, and on the reliability of the
line. The regulator observes the cost, the capacity, and reliability62, but does not
observe the firm's type, {3, and its effort level, e. ({3 E [~,!JJ, and is distributed
with density f ({3) , and cdf F ({3)).
The timing is as follows:
1. The regulator chooses the contract.
2. The firm chooses K, X12, and e.
3. The state of the world is revealed.
4. The system operator chooses the dispatch.
62We realize that reliability is not completely observable in the real world. The choice of
materials and technology in the construction of a transmission line can yield an estimate of
the actual reliability of the line, but other factors such as maintenance activities may not be
observable to the regulator. A rigorous way to model this fact is to consider reliability of a
line as a function of a decision variable which represents all observable variables, and an effort
level specific to line reliability. However, this would make the model more difficult to solve, and
hence will be omitted.
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The importance of the timing comes only from its effect on the information
set of the regulator and the firm when they make their decisions. The regula-
tor designs the contract without knowing the type of firm or the state of the
world. The contract is binding for both parties, and is verifiable in court. This
assumption eliminates the possibility of the regulator learning the type of firm,
and re-writing the contract.63
The firm makes its decision without knowing the state of the world, and
maximizes the expectation of profit over the states of the world at stage 2. The
probability of having line (1,2) 'up' is equal to the reliability of the line, which is
chosen by the firm. This is an interesting problem in the sense that the decision
maker chooses both the probability distribution and payoffs in each state of the
world in order to maximize expected profit.
The cost is determined by the type of the firm, the effort level, line capacity,
and reliability:
C Co + C1 ({3, e, K, X12)
where there exists a cardinalization of e and {3 such that C(3 > 0, Ce < 0;
and CK > 0, CX12 > O. Co refers to fixed cost in line construction64 for K > O.
63It seems that this setup is not renegotiation proof, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
64The fixed cost results from the cost of land (or rights-of-way) on which the lines are built,
and from the cost of transmission towers, support structures, etc. which we can safely assume
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Following the convention in Laffont and Tirole [13], assume that the cost is
reimbursed to the firm, plus a transfer is given. The line built by the firm is
not explicitly rented by the regulator to the users of the network because the
price of using the line (transmission price) is implicitly included in the price
of electricity65. In other words, we view the line as a good with no revenue at
the time of the contract. Moreover, we formulate the regulation problem as a
direct revelation mechanism, in which the firm reports its type to the regulator,
who then calculates the transfer and other observable variables according to a
pre-specified optimal formula.
Therefore, the risk-neutral firm gets a utility of U _ t - 'ljJ(e), where t is
the transfer to the firm, and 'ljJ(e) is the disutility of effort to the firm( 'ljJ' > 0,
'ljJ" > 0).
Suppose that transferring money to the firm is distortionary, Le. each dollar
transferred to the firm costs (1 + J.L) to the society66. Then, social welfare is the
to be independent of the line capacity.
65Transmission price of sending power from node i to node j is defined as Pj - Pi, where Pi is
the optimal spot price of electricity at node i.
660ne might argue that the system operator could use the profit at the stage of spot-pricing
to help the regulator pay transfers to the line owner. This is a reasonable argument considering
the fact that raising funds to pay transfers is costly to the regulator. Therefore, such use of
profits from the spot-pricing would reduce the social cost of each dollar of transfer to the firm.
However, we assume that the system operator and the regulator do not have an agreement to
share profits, and that the system operator returns the profit back to electricity consumers and
producers as a lump-sum transfer.
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sum of the expected social price of the line, minus the cost of total transfers,
and the utility of firm:
q,(K > 0) - XI2 Vi(K) + (1 - X12) va - (1 + J-L) [C + t] + U
where
Vi(K) = XI3 SWll (K) + (1- X13) SWlO(K) : the expected social value when
line (1,2) is 'up'.
va = XI3 SWOl + (1 - X13) SWaa : the expected social value when line (1,2)
is'down'.
The following lemma presents the non-convexity in the objective function.
Lemma 1. The social value function, Vi(K), has a discontinuity at K = o.
Proof: In Appendix.
The intuition of this result can be stated as follows. When the line (1,2)
does not exist, generators at nodes 1 and 2 run according to the unconstrained
economic dispatch rule. Our assumption on the generation cost implies that this
corresponds to generating m times as much electricity at the cheap generator
as at the expensive generator. Moreover, this dispatch is exactly the same
as the dispatch when the line (1,2) exists but is not congested. Hence, the
social welfare67 when the line does not exist is the same as that when the line
67To avoid any confusion, we should note that the social welfare here corresponds to the
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exists but is not congested. We also know that social welfare increases68 with
line capacity, and does not make a negative jump when the line becomes non-
congested. Therefore, there must be a discontinuity in social welfare function
at K = O.
We can re-write the social welfare function by using the definition of the
utility of the firm (when the line capacity is strictly positive) as
<I>(K > 0) = X12Vi(K) + (1 - X12)va - (1 + J-L) [0 + 1f(e)] - J-LU
Social welfare in the absence of line (1, 2) is
<I>(K = 0) = va
The next section will establish the benchmark case, in which the regulator
observes everything. Then, we will be able to see the consequences of asymmetric
information on regulated variables.
notation SW, which does not have anything to do with reliability. The only difference between
having a non-congested line and not having the line is reliability, which affects only the expected
social welfare, Vi,
68More precisely, an increase in line capacity increases social welfare when the line is congested,
and does not have any impact when the line is not congested.
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3.5.2. Complete Information
The regulator observes both e and f3.69 It is possible to choose not to have the
line, Le. K = 0, which creates the non-convexity. The solution strategy is first
to solve for the optimum when K > 0, and then to compare the implied social
welfare to the one when K = O.
Therefore, the regulator chooses U (f3) ,e (f3) , K (f3) ,X12 (f3) given70 f3 to solve
Max X12 Vi(K) + (1- X12) va - (1 + J1) [0 + 7jJ(e)] - J1 U
s.to U(f3) 2:: 0 Vf3
Let A = X13Al(K)+(1-X13)AO(K) be the expected shadow price of line (1,2) over
the states of line (1,3). Then, the optimum must satisfy the following FOC'S71
for an interior solution (when the line exists)72:
U (f3) = 0 Vf3 (3.3)
69This is only a sufficient condition for obtaining complete information. The necessary and
sufficient condition is to observe either e or {3, because the regulator can infer the unobserved
one by observing only one of them.
70 Note that {3 is observed under complete information.
71These FOe's do not necessarily imply the uniqueness of the solution. The required con-
ditions for uniqueness involve restrictions on the third derivatives of the cost function, hence
they are too restrictive, and will be omitted. Interested readers are referred to Kamien and
Schwarz [12] (pp. 204-211), Arrow and Kurz [1] (pp. 43-51), and Seierstad and Sydsaeter [19]
(pp. 367-391) for some sufficiency results in optimal control problems.
72In order to assure K > 0, assume that the benefit of having infinitesimal capacity exceeds
the fixed cost, Le. lim (X12' V1(K) - (1 + J.L) . Co) > 0 .
K-+O
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'ljJ' (e)
X12 ).,(K)
Vi(K) - va
(1+/1) CK
(1 + /1) CX12
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
The first equation says that the firm must get its reservation payoff (which
is assumed to be zero without any loss of generality), i.e. the transfer must be
equal to the disutility from expending the optimal effort level. Since the type
of firm is known to the regulator, the firm cannot earn any information rent.
Equation 3.4 shows that the effort level must be chosen such that the marginal
disutility is equal to the decrease in cost due to increased effort. Equation 3.5
says the line capacity must be at the level where the marginal social value,
X12 (X13Al(K) + (1 - X13)).,o(K)) , is equal to the social marginal cost of capacity,
which takes into account the fact that transfers to the firm are costly to the
society. Finally, equation 3.6 is the FOe for line reliability. The marginal
benefit of reliability is the difference in value to the society of having the line
'up' and 'down', i.e. "Vl(K) - lIcJ.
Social welfare when K > 0 must be compared to that when K = o. Hence,
the regulator chooses to have the line with type /3 if
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xh Vi(K*) + (1 - Xi2) va - (1 + J-L) [0* + 'IjJ(e*)] ~ va , or
ep (K* > 0) ~ ep (K = 0)
where stars denote optimal values under complete information.
Before going any further, we can discuss the contribution of this analysis
with endogenous (compared to exogenous) reliability using FOG's 3.5 through
3.6. As opposed to having an arbitrary level of reliability, equation 3.6 tells us
that reliability should be chosen by considering the additional benefit and cost at
the margin. But more importantly, equation 3.5 implies that the optimal choice
of line capacity potentially depends on reliability. Although a higher reliability
mayor may not imply a higher capacity, there is a relation between them in
general. Under some conditions, the capacity may be independent of reliability.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for this independence.
Lemma 2. The first-best capacity level is independent of the line reliability if
i-) reliabilIty is non-zero, and ii-) the cost function is such that
o = 1((3, e) + J(K, X12), where a~J(K, X12) = X12 G(K) for any functions 1
and G73.
Proof: Under the second condition, the equation 3.5 can be written as
73 More precisely, for functions I and G that satisfy Second-Order Conditions.
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X12 A(K) = (1 + /-l) X12 G(K).
Since X12 =f 0, then the equation reduces to
A(K) = (1 + /-l) G(K), which is independent of X12. Moreover, the sepa-
rability of the cost function implies that the FOe for effort (equation 3.4) is
only determined by effort, e. Therefore, the optimal capacity is independent of
reliability. QED.
This result is quite intuitive. If reliability affects the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of capacity in the same way, then its level will not be decisive in
the choice of capacity.
3.5.3. Incomplete Information
After finding the complete information optimum, we now analyze the optimal
regulation when the regulator does not observe e and (3.
Let E ((3, C, K, X12) be the effort level required for a firm of type (3 to supply
capacity K with reliability X12 at cost C. Our assumptions for the cost function
imply
E{3 > 0, Ee < 0, EK > 0, and EX12 > 0.
Since the regulator does not observe the type of the firm, optimal regulation
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is chosen by maximizing expected social welfare over possible types of the firm.
A truth-telling mechanism requires two types of constraints: incentive compat-
ibility (IC), and individual rationality (IR). The first one requires the firm to
reveal its type truthfully, and the second guarantees participation of all types of
firms 74 • IC constraints can be represented by the FOC of the firm's problem75
under some sufficiency conditions as stated in the following Lemma.
. .
Lemma 3. Ie constraint can be replaced by U ((3) = -¢'(e) E{3, if
ii-) C({3) 2:: 0, K({3) ~ 0, X12 ({3) ~ °at the optimum77 .
Proof: (In Appendix)
The original IR constraint is to give at least zero utility to any type, Le.
- .
U({3) 2:: 0. But we can replace it with U({3) 2:: 0, because U ((3) is negative. 78
74A formal representation of IC constraints can b.: stated as follows: let 'P({3,~) denote the
expected utility of a type {3 firm when it reports {3 to the regulator. Then, a truth-telling
mechanism is such that for each type {3,
cp({3, {3) ~ cp({3,~) V~'
75The firm reports its type to the regulator in order to maximize its payoff. If that problem
implies a unique solution, then the firm's behaviour can be represented by the FOC.
76Ce{3 ~ 0 means that the cost reducing effect of effort does not increase as the line capacity
gets larger. C{3K ~ 0 says the marginal cost of capacity is not less for a less productive firm.
77These conditions are not imposed, but rather are to be checked at the optimum to guarantee
the uniqueness of the solution for the fir~'s problem. In fact, these are sufficient but not
necessary conditions. We need only 'P21 ({3, {3) ~ 0, which can be satisfied by weaker conditions
on C, K, and X12 . See Mirrlees [14] (pp. 3-20) and Rogerson [17] (pp. 1361-1367) for further
analyses on the validity of the First-Order Approach to solve Principal-Agent problems.
78This can be seen from the FOC of the firm's problem, U ({3) = -7jJ'(e) . E{3. Since E{3 > 0
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The regulator chooses U ((3) , e ((3) , K ((3) , X12 ((3) to maximize the expected
value (over types) of the social welfare function <I> subject to the Ie and IR
constraints:
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Max J
f!.
{X12Vi(K) + (1- X12)VO - (1 + /-l) [C + 7j;(e)] -/-lU} f ((3) d(3
s.t.
U(!3) ~ 0
•U ((3) = -7j;'(e) ·EfJ
(3.7)
(3.8)
Again, the problem is solved for K > 0, hence this should be checked after
finding the solution. The implied social welfare must again be compared to the
social welfare when K = O.
Let U be the state variable, e, K, X12 be the control variables, and 7] be the
co-state variable. Then, we have an optimal control problem with a bounded
state variable. At the optimum, U(!3) = 0 due to the transversality condition79 .
and 'IjJ' > 0, the result follows.
79Either the co-state variable or the state variable must be zero at the terminal point, /3. The
co-state variable takes a positive value, hence U(/3) must be zero. To see that, take the FOe
for the state variable, which is
i]({3) = J1- • f({3), _
and integrate it over (3, and get ry({3) = J1- • F({3) for any (3. Then, ry({3) > 0.
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Hence, we can ignore constraint 3.7. The FOe's for the interior solution80
become:
U({J) = 0
"p' (e) + Ce = - 1 ~ J1 ~~?w E(3 +"p' E(3c Ce ]
J1F ({3) , d
(X12 A(K) - (1 + J1) CK) = f ({3) 'l/J dK E{3
J1F ({3) , d
(V1(K)-VO-(I+J1) CX12 ) = f({3) 'l/J dX12E{3
(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11)
(3.12)
Let's denote the variables satisfying these FOe's by fJ, e, K, and X12. Equa-
tion 3.9 shows the information rent for the least efficient firm ({3 = {J) under
the optimal regulation. That type of firm does not receive any information rent
because it is unable to act like a less efficient firm by reducing its effort level.
However, all other types ({3 < {J) have that imitation ability, hence they get a
positive rent. We can see this by looking at equation 3.8, which implies that
•U ({3) < o.
For all types of firms except the most efficient one, the effort level under
BOThe Second-Order conditions will be omitted, since they are too restrictive. The interested
reader can be referred to Kamien and Schwarz [12] and Arrow and Kurz [1] for some sufficiency
results.
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incomplete information is less than the level under complete information when
all other variables have the same values81 . This can be seen by noting that
equation 3.10 differs from equation 3.4 only by the RHS of the equation. For
j3 > ii, - [?jJ" . E{3 + ?jJ' . E{3c . Ce ] < 082 represents the change in the total rent
received by types within [ii, j3] due to an increase in the effort level of type
j3. This has a probability F (j3), and each unit of increase in rent costs J-l to
society. This must be weighed against the distortion created by moving away
from the first-best effort level, which is determined by solving ?jJ' (e) = -Ceo The
distortion creates a social cost of (?jJ'(e) + Ce )(l + J-l) for type j3, which happens
with probability f(j3). Therefore, the second-best effort level is determined by
the balance of these two costs, as shown in equation 3.10.
The capacity level is determined by equation 3.11. Similar to the analysis
of effort level, an increase in capacity for type j3 changes the total rent of types
within [ii, j3] by?jJ'· d~E{3, which occurs with probability F(j3). Moreover, moving
away from the first-best level of capacity for type j3 creates distortion, which
costs (X12A(K) - (1 + J-l) . CK ) with probability f(j3)·
Equation 3.12 shows the rule for selecting the level of reliability. The RHS of
81 In the special case of GeK = G ex12 = 0, we do not need the last reservation.
82This term becomes negative due to our previous assumptions: Ej3 > 0, Gee > 0, and
Gj3e 2:: 0.
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the equation includes the marginal cost to society of increased rents, and LHS
includes the marginal cost of distortion due to incomplete information.
The last comment about FOC's concerns the comparison of the second-best
outcome among different types of firms. The first-best levels of effort, capacity,
and reliability are obtained when the firm is the most efficient one ({3 = (3), but
at the expense of rewarding the highest information rent. For less efficient types,
the optimal regulation implies a lower information rent and more distortion. In
the extreme case of the least efficient type with {3 = {3, the information rent is
zero and the distortion is the highest.
The following result establishes the condition under which the first-best ca-
pacity and reliability levels can be obtained for all types of firms:
Proposition 1. (From Laffont and Tirole [13]) The optimal regulation
under incomplete information yields the first-best capacity and reliability levels
(K = K*, and X12 = Xi2) if and only if there is a function ~ such that
c = C( ~({3, e), K, X12)
Proof:
We can write the cost function as C = C ({3, E({3, C, K, X12), K, X12) . Differ-
entiating with respect to {3 yields
o= C(3 + Ce E(3, or E(3 = -g;.
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But the separability assumption in the proposition implies that C(3 - f.(3Ce - f. e '
which is independent of K and X12· Therefore, d~Ef3 = d:
1
2 Ef3 = 0, meaning
that the first-best capacity and reliability levels are obtained in equations 3.11
and 3.12. The "only if" part of the proposition can be proved similarly.
(For the original proof, see Proposition 3.4 in Laffont and Tirole [13]) •
If the cost function takes this special form, then capacity and reliability
do not affect the firm's ability to obtain information rent83 . In general, the
regulator uses observable variables (C, K, X12) as instruments in order to limit
this information rent. But the special functional form of the cost function in
the proposition makes it impossible for the regulator to use K and X12 for that
purpose because the relation between f3 and e is fixed by the known function ~.
Hence, we obtain a dichotomy between the selection of K and X12 on one hand,
and the regulation of effort level on the other hand.
Algebraically, this independence is satisfied if we have d~Ef3 = ~12 Ef3 =
O. Then, equations 3.11 and 3.12 reduce to the FOe's for K and X12 under
the complete information case. Therefore, separability of the cost function in
83Note that a firm can act like a less efficient type by reducing its effort such that the observed
cost remains the same.
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the form given in the proposition enables the regulator to obtain the first-best
capacity and reliability levels even under incomplete information.
Another implication of the special functional form of cost function is related
to the implementation of the optimal capacity and reliability. In general, transfer
to the firm depends on all observable variables. However, the dichotomy that
we mentioned above implies that the firm can be rewarded only as a function
of the realization of ~({3, e)84. Hence, the optimal transfer function takes the
form of t = T(~) for the appropriate T(·) function to be determined in the
implementation phase.
84Even though the regulator cannot separately observe {3 and e, their aggregate contribution
~ is inferred from the observable variables C, K and X12.
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Do We Need the Line at All?
The analysis so far has concentrated on finding the optimal capacity and
reliability levels if the regulator has already decided to build the line. The more
fundamental question is whether building the line is more beneficial to society
than not building it. Due to the non-convexity of the problem at K = 0, we were
unable to answer this question when we solved the optimal regulation problem
under incomplete information. However, the solution that we obtained for the
optimal regulation will be used in deciding whether to build the line or not. In
particular, building the line is optimal if the expected value (over types) of the
social welfare function evaluated at the optimum (K > 0) is greater than the
social welfare of not having the line, Le. if
fi -f <p(K) f({3) d{3 > <p(K = 0) = Vo.
(i
Intuitively speaking, a line should be built between nodes 1 and 2 if sending
electricity to node 3 is not reliable enough with the existing network. The next
result formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 2. The regulator is more likely to have a line between nodes
1 and 2 as the reliability of line (1,3) decreases. More precisely, let A(X13) be
the set of technologies and parameters for which line (1,2) is desirable for each
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Proof: In Appendix.
One reason for not building line (1, 2) seems to be the high generation cost
that has to be incurred in case of congestion. If you build that line, then the
expensive generator at node 2 has to be used more than optimally when the
line is congested. This increases the cost of supplying electricity. However, one
must also consider the fact that the demand has to be met by only the expensive
generator when line (1,3) fails and line (1,2) is not there. The following result
presents that trade off.
Proposition 3. The regulator is more likely to have a line between nodes
1 and 2 as the marginal cost of generator 2 increases (due to an increase in
parameter m) if i) line (1,2) is not congested, or ii) the reliability of line (1,3) is
not too high. More precisely, let B(C2) be the set of technologies and parameters
for which line (1,2) is desirable for each level of C2. Then for C2 < C2, B(C2) C
B(C2) under the two given conditions.
Proof: In Appendix.
If we know85 that the line will not be congested when we build the optimal
capacity, then we use generators up to the point where their marginal costs are
85We 'know'whether the line will be congested or not because the optimal choice of capacity
(given the line is there) determines the existence of congestion.
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equal. An increase in the marginal cost of generator 2 will affect the social
welfare the same whether line (1,2) is there or not. On the other hand, if we
know that the line will be congested, then we need to compare the benefit of
not being stuck with the expensive generator to the increased electricity cost
due to congestion. In this case, the benefit outweighs cost if the probability of
being in the state when generator 2 is the only available option is high enough,
i.e. (1 - X13) is high enough.
One might think that the need for extra lines on the network increases as
the demand for electricity grows. The following result establishes the relation
between the magnitude of demand at node 3 and the decision to build the line
(1,2).
Proposition 4. An increase in demand at node 3 (due to an increase in
demand parameter a) makes it more likely to choose building the line if i-)
the optimal capacity (given the line is built) does not imply congestion, or ii-)
reliability of line (1,3) is not too high. More precisely, let V(a) be the set of
technologies and parameters for which line (1,2) is desirable for each level of a.
Then for a < a, V(a) C V(a) when the line is congested.
Proof: In Appendix.
The following result compares the decision to build a line under complete
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and incomplete information.
Proposition 5. If it is optimal not to build line (1,2) under complete
information, then the same is true under incomplete information.
Proof: In Appendix.
If building a line is not optimal for society under incomplete information,
then the maximum value of social welfare with the line has to be less than social
welfare without the line. The addition of incomplete information to this picture
adds incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. Therefore,
maximum value of social welfare in this constrained problem has to be less
than the maximum value in the unconstrained problem. This is why the non-
optimality of building a line under complete information implies non-optimality
of building it under incomplete information.
An interesting question is whether it is of benefit to society to have a line
which is not congested, Le. the power flowing on the line is less than the line
capacity. In a static analysis of investment like ours, building an extra unit of
capacity which will not be used to transmit power does not benefit society, yet it
has a cost. This straightforward reasoning implies that the line capacity should
not be more than the amount of electricity flowing on it. This intuition is correct
under complete information, but not necessarily under incomplete information.
90
When the regulator cannot observe type and effort of the firm, the optimal
capacity might imply a non-congested line for a large class of cost functions.
Specifically, when the cost of building a line is not separable in the sense of the
condition given in Proposition 1, then the regulator uses capacity and reliability
as instruments in order to affect the information rent of the firm. If an increase
in capacity can be used to reduce the firm's information rent, then the optimal
capacity can be more than the power flowing on the line. The next proposition
formalizes that result.
Proposition 6. i-) Under complete information, line (1,2) must be con-
gested in some states of the world. More precisely, the shadow price of line (1,2)
must be strictly greater than zero in state 10 when X13 < 1.
ii-) Under incomplete information, the line can be non-congested in all states
of the world if an increase in capacity reduces the firm's information rent. More
precisely, the shadow price in state 10 can be equal to zero if d~ E/3 < 0 and
j3 >(i .
Proof: In Appendix.
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3.5.4. An Illustration
In this section, we present a numerical example to illustrate some of the results
derived in the paper. We assume the line construction cost takes the following
functional form:
The disutility of effort to the firm is assumed to be
1j;(e) = e;
For ease of exposition, suppose that there are only two types of firms (efficient
type and inefficient type) instead of a continuum of types as assumed in the
paper. The firm is of type !i (efficient) with probability p, and ~ (inefficient)
with probability (1 - p), where fl < ~. Then, we can obtain the FOe's similar
to equations 3.9-3.12 under incomplete information as follows86 :
U(fl)
U(~)
e(fl)
e({3)
U({3) = e2(~) _ ~r2 > a
- 2 2
U(~) = 0
1 - e(fl) = 0
- P J-L {3-(3 2- -1- e({3) = ----=K ((3) X12(!3)
1-pl+J-L 2
86A sketch for the derivation of FOe's for this discrete-type example is given in appendix.
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K([!)
K({j)
X12({!) V{(K({!)) - (1 + fl)(l + (!)K({}) Xi2({!) = 0
X12({j) V{(K({j)) - (1 + fl)(l + (j)K({j) Xi2({j) = fl-P-{j - IiK({j) Xi2({j)r
1-p 2
Vi(K(Ii)) - Va - (1 + fl)(l + Ii)K2(1i) X12(1i) = 0
Vi(K({j)) - va - (1 + fl)(l + (j)K2({j) X12({j) = fl-P-{j - Ii K 2({j) X12({j)r
1-p 2
where r = e({j) - 7i;f!. K2({j) Xi2({j) is the marginal disutility of potential
reduction in effort level for the efficient type (type Ii) by mimicking the inefficient
type (or by reporting (j as its type).
The parameters of the problem are assumed to take the following values
throughout the example unless otherwise stated:
a = 50, b = 0.2, m = 1.5, X13 = 0.8, fl = 0.5, Ii = 0.2, {j = 0.21, p = 0.1
As a reminder, a and b are parameters of electricity demand, and m measures
how expensive the marginal cost of generation at node 2 relative to the one at
node 1. The parameter fl is the cost to society of raising funds in order to make
transfers to the line owner, and {3 measures the type of the line owner (the higher
the {3, the less productive the firm). Finally, p is the proportion of efficient types
(type Ii) of firms.
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First of all, we will illustrate Proposition 1 by showing that the optimal
capacity and reliability under complete information are not the same as the
ones under incomplete information.
Complete Information Incomplete Information
K((jJ X12([i) K({J) X12({J) K([i) X12([i) K({J) X12(fJ) U([i) U(lJ)
a = 20 3.000 0.588 3.000 0.583 3.000 0.588 1.721 1.000 0.015 a
a = 150 13.006 1.000 12.911 1.000 13.006 1.000 12.910 1.000 0.460 a
(Table 6)
The first thing to note is that the efficient firm supplies the same amount of
capacity and reliability under both complete and incomplete information. This
first-best outcome for the efficient type is obtained at the expense of giving
information rent (U([i) > 0) to that type. On the other hand, the regulator
does not leave any rent to the inefficient type (U(lJ) = 0) at the expense of not
getting the first-best levels of capacity and reliability.
Moreover, we observe that the inefficient type does not necessarily supply
lower reliability compared to the efficient type under incomplete information.
When the demand for electricity is such that a = 20, the inefficient type builds
a line with a perfect reliability of 1.000, as opposed to an inferior reliability of
0.588 by the efficient type. The values given in Table 1 are optimal assuming
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that we have already decided to build a line. However, it is optimal not to build
the line when a = 20, and optimal to build when a = 150.
We will now illustrate Proposition 2, which is about the sensitivity of the
decision to build a line to the reliability of another line on the network. As we
can see in the second column of Table 2, the advantage87 of having a line between
nodes 1 and 2 diminishes as the reliability of line (1,3), X13, increases. In fact,
it is optimal to build the line when X13 :::; 0.374 , but not when Xl3 2:: 0.374 (not
shown on the table). Moreover, the optimal reliability (assuming we want to
build it) of line (1,2) decreases as the reliability of line (1,3) increases. Finally,
a look at the results for X13 = 1.0 reveals that the optimal reliability (given the
line is built) for line (1,2) is zero. It means that we cannot improve welfare
by building a reliable88 line between nodes 1 and 2 when the line connecting 1
and 3 never fails. In this case, the new line will only create congestion, but no
improvement in network reliability.
87The advantage is defined as the difference in welfare when we have the line with optimal
capacity versus the welfare when we do not build the line.
88We use the word reliable for any reliability level greater than zero.
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X13 <I> (K > 0) - <I>(K = 0) K({}) K(7J) X12(Q) X12 (/3) U({})
0.3 +31.6 11.771 11.704 1.00 1.00 0.433
0.8 -130.3 4.335 4.303 1.00 1.00 0.088
0.9 -144.5 4.118 4.118 0.562 0.558 0.026
1.0 -149.3 5.990 5.902 a a a
(Table 7)
The next illustration is for Proposition 3, which analyzes the relation between
the decision to build a line and the marginal generation cost of the expensive
generator on the network. The result depends partly on whether the existing
lines on the network are reliable enough. Therefore, we present two cases, one
with X13 = 0.7 (low reliability of existing lines), and another with X13 = 0.99
(high reliability). In the former case, an increase in the marginal generation
cost (an increase in m from 2.3 to 2.4) makes the regulator more likely to build
the line (1,2). This can be seen from the second column of Table 3, where the
difference in welfare of having and not having the line decreases. But in the
latter case, an increase in m makes it less likely to have the line. This is because
of the trade-off between being stuck with the expensive generator when line (1,3)
fails versus having to use the expensive generator when line (1,2) is congested.
As X13 increases, the probability of being stuck with the expensive generator
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falls, hence the regulator is concerned more with congestion implications.
When XI3 = 0.7, we have
m <I>(K>O) -<I>(K=O) K([}) K(lJ) XI2 ([i) XI2 (lJ) U([i)
2.3 -106.012 7.050 7.050 0.987 0.979 0.208
2.4 -106.008 7.300 7.300 0.953 0.945 0.208
(Table 8)
When XI3 = 0.99, we have
m <I> (K > 0) - <I>(K = 0) K([i) K(lJ) XI2 ([i) XI2 (lJ) U([i)
2.3 -149.202 8.337 7.313 0.027 0.031 0.001
2.4 -149.250 6.166 7.357 0 0 a
(Table 9)
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3.6. Conclusion
This paper formulates the optimal regulation of investment and reliability of
transmission lines in a deregulated electricity market set-up. The first contribu-
tion of this paper is to analyze the influence of line reliability as an endogenous
variable in a regulatory framework under incomplete information. The second is
to consider the structure of the network as endogenous by investigating whether
to build a line between two nodes of the network.
Under certain assumptions, I show that the regulator can design a contract
for the line owner so that the first-best capacity and reliability levels are ob-
tained. Moreover, I find that the existence of a line is justified when reliability
of other lines on the network is not too high. In an extreme case when all other
lines on the network are perfectly reliable with enough capacities, there is no
need to connect some nodes by building additional lines. Such extra lines will
only increase the possibility of network congestion without improving the reli-
ability of network. However, when some of the other lines do not have enough
capacity or when they are not perfectly reliable, society may get benefit from
additional lines.
Another result argues that under some conditions building a line between
the cheap and the expensive generator is more advantageous as the marginal
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cost of the expensive generator increases. I further argue that the optimality of
building a line with the expectation of a growing demand in the future depends
on whether we expect the new line to be congested, and also on the reliability of
other lines. Finally, I analyze whether it is socially optimal to have a non-
congested line under complete and incomplete information structures. It is
always optimal to have a congested line under complete information, but that
result does not always hold under incomplete information.
I plan to check the generality of these results under more complex network
structures in my future studies. Moreover, I will study the implementation of
the optimal regulation contract, because my analysis so far has only provided a
general characterization of the outcome of regulation, rather than specific reward
formulas to be used in real world applications.
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3.7. Appendix
Results for the optimal dispatch
The following table gives social welfare evaluated at the optimal dispatch for
given line capacity in three states of the world.
o K a(m-l) a(m-l) <K< ma K ma< < 3(m+b+bm) 3(m+b+bm) m+b+bm > m+b+bm
SWll
4a2+3K(2a(m-l)-3K(m+b+bm)) a2 (I+m) a2 (I+m)
2((1+4b+m) 2(m+b+bm) 2(m+b+bm)
SWlO
a2+K (2ma- K (b+m+bm)) a2+ K(2ma- K (b+m+bm)) a2 (I+m)
2(b+m) 2(b+m) 2(m+b+bm)
SWOl
a2 (I+m) a2 (I+m) a2 (I+m)
2(m+b+bm) 2(m+b+bm) 2(m+b+bm)
SWoo a
2 a2 a2
2(b+m) 2(b+m) 2(b+m)
SWao < SWlO SWao < SWlO SWao < SWlO
< SW11 < SWOl < SWll = SWOl = SWll = SWOl
Al
3a(m-l)-3K(m+b+bm) 0 01+4b+m
Ao
am-K(b+m+bm) am-K(b+m+bm) ab+m b+m
1!, > v; if x < SW j 0 -SWop Vi>VO VI> VO1 a 13 SWIO-SWOO+SWOl-SWll
Table Al
The first interval for the line capacity corresponds to congestion in state 11
and 10. The second one refers to no congestion in state 11,and congestion in
state 10. The congestion does not happen in either state when the capacity is
in the last interval. Note that the expected benefit of having line (1,2) does not
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always exceed the expected benefit of not having it (Vi vs. va). For capacity
levels less than 3(~~~~m)' the comparison depends on the reliability of line (1,3).
This is the interval of capacity levels for which the price at the demand node
exceeds the marginal cost of the cheapest generator when both lines are 'up'.
Example 4:When m = 1.5, a = 600, b = 0.2, we have the following results:
~ 0 < K < 50 I 50 < K < 450 I K > 450 I
SWl1 218182 + 600K-6K
2 225000 2250002.2
SWlO 105882 + 1800K-2K
2 105882 + 1800K-2K2 2250003.4 3.4
SWQ1 225000 225000 225000
SWoo 105882 105882 105882
Al 300-6K 0 01.1
Ao 900-2K 900-2K 01.7 -1.-7-
(Table A2)
A graphical representation of the comparison of social welfare in each state
of the world is given in Figure 7 in the following page.
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Proof of Lemma 1:
When line (1,2) is not built, expected social value is
Once infinitesimal capacity is there, the expected social value becomes
lim X13 SWl1 (K) + (1 - X13) SWlO(K).
K-O
From the first table in Appendix, we can see that
lim SWlO(K) = SWoo, but lim SWl1 (K) < SWOl .
K-O K-O
Therefore, the social value function has a discontinuity at K = O.•
Proof89 of Lemma 3:
A firm with type 13 announces a type, ~, (which may not be the true type)
to maximize its expected utility:
(3.13)
Then, the FOe is !P2(j3,~) = o. Hence, a truth telling mechanism must satisfy
!P2 (13, 13) = o.
Now suppose that ~ = 13 is not the global optimum, or ~ =1= 13· Then,
'P(j3,~) > !P (13,13) , or
fiJ 'P2 (13, x) dx > o.
{3
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But we can re-write this by subtracting 1{J2 ((3, (3) = 0 as
73 (3
JJ1{J21(Y' x)dydx > 0
(3 x
We can use equation 3.13 to get
(3.14)
1{J21 ((3,~) = :73 [-7j/(e) E(3]
= -1//' E{J [Ec C+EK K+EX12 X12] - 1jJ' [E{JC C+E{JK K+E{JX12 X12]
If E(3c ~ 0, E(3K 2: 0, E(3x12 2: 0 (which are equivalent to the conditions in
part (i) of the lemma) and if conditions in part (ii) holds, then 1{J21 ({3,~) 2: O.
Now consider two cases: ~ < {3, and ~ > {3. In the first case x E [~, {3], which
contradicts equation 3.14. In the second case x E [(3,~], which again contradicts
equation 3.14. Therefore, ~ = (3 is the global optimum.•
Proof of Proposition 2:
li ~
As X13 increases, the marginal increase in f <I>(K) f((3) d(3 is less than the
f!.
marginal increase in va. To see that, differentiate w.r.t. X13, and get
lif [X12(SW11 (K) - SW lO(K)) + (1 - X12)(SWOl-SWOO )] f((3)d(3 - (SWOl - SWoo )
f!.
104
p ~! X12(SWu (K) - SW01 (K))f(f3)df3 +! X12(SWOO - SWlQ(K))f(f3)df3:S; 0
~ ~
The reason for the last inequality comes from the fact that SWn (K) -
SWQ1(K) ::; 0, and SWaa - SWlO (K) < 0 for all K. Therefore, an increase
in X13 reduces the difference between the social welfare of having line (1,2) and
the social welfare of not having it. •
Proof of Proposition 3:
Again, we start from the expression used to determine whether to build the
~
line: J q>(K) f(f3) d{3 - 'IcJ. Differentiating w.r.t. m yields:
~
The terms in brackets take different values for different levels of capacity.
For 0 < K < 3(::'~~~)' the term equals X13 (3: - a-~) + K(l - X13),
h . ···f bK(2a-bK)Hence, t e term IS posItIve 1 X13 < 2 (bK(2a-bK) (2a-3(1+2b)K)2 a 2 ).
(b+m) (b+rn) 2 + (1+4 b+rn)2 (b+m+b rn)2
For 3(~~~~m) < K < m+n;:~bm ' the term becomes (1- X13) (b~(~;b~;<)) , which
is positive if X13 -=F 1.
k b (1 ) ( a2bm(2b+bm+2m) )For K > abc2 , the terms in brac ets ecome - X13 2(m+b)2(m+b+bm)2 ,
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which is greater than zero if X13 -11.
In sum, expression 3.15 is positive for 0 < K < a(m-l) if X13 is not too3(m+b+bm)
high. This capacity interval corresponds to a congested line. It is greater than
zero for K > 3(mc~~~L) if X13 -I 1. This capacity interval corresponds to a non-
congested line in state 11. Therefore, as the marginal cost of the expensive
generator gets higher, the regulator is more likely to build the line i) when the
line is congested, or ii) when the reliability is not too high. •
Proof of Proposition 4:
Under incomplete information, building line (1,2) is optimal if
73 ~J q>(K) f({3) d{3 - va > o.
f!.
Differentiating the LHS of the inequality w.r.t. a yields:
73J X12 [X13(as:ll - aSa:Ol ) + (1 - X13)( aSa:10 - as~OO)] f({3)d{3.
(i
B t aSWll aswOl < 0 £ K a(m-l) d I £ K > a(m-l) .U aa - aa lor < 3(m+b+bm) ' an equa s zero lor - 3(m+b+bm) '
and aSa~10 - as~oo > 0 for all K. Then the integral becomes greater than
zero when the line is not congested (K 2 3(~~~bL») or Xl3 is not too high.
The upper limit for X13 is 1 when the line is not congested, and it is equal
8SWlO _ 8SWoo
to ~_~+~_~when the line is congested. Hence, an increase in
8a 8a 8a 8a
demand makes it more likely to choose building the line when the line is not
congested, and makes it less likely when the line is congested.•
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Since it is optimal not to build the line under complete information, we have
73
iP ({3, K*) < "'0. Taking the expectation over types gives J iP({3, K*) f({3) d{3 <
f!.
~ 73
"'0. But K was obtained by maximizing J iP({3, K) f({3) d(3 subject to the Ie
f!.
constraint. The solution to an unconstrained problem yields an optimal value of
the objective function which is greater than or equal to the one obtained from
a constrained problem. Therefore,
73 ~ 73J iP((3, K) f({3) d(3 ~ J 'P((3, K*) f((3) d(3 < "'0.
f!. f!.
Therefore, the regulator does not build the line under incomplete information
either. •
Proof of Proposition 6:
First of all, recall that the expected shadow price was defined as A(K)
X13 Al(K) + (1 - X13)Ao(K), where Al(K) refers to the shadow price of line (1,2)
when line (1,3) is 'up', and Ao(K) refers to the shadow price when line (1,3) is
'down'. Moreover, we can see from the spot-pricing results in Appendix that if
Al(K) > 0, then Ao(K) > 0; and if {Ao(K) = 0 and X13 < 1}, then Al(K) = O.
Therefore, we can conclude that A(K) = 0 {:} Ao(K) = 0 and X13 < 1. Now we
can prove the results:
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i-) Under complete information, the FOC for a non-zero90 capacity is
Suppose >'(K*) = 0, or Ao(K*) = O. Then the FOC implies that CK = 0,
which contradicts with the assumption that CK > 0, Le. cost of an additional
capacity is always positive. Therefore, we must have Ao(K*) > 0 when X13 < 1.
ii-) Under incomplete information, the FOC for a non-zero capacity is
X12 A(K) - (1 + J-L) CK = Jt~g) 1jJ' d~Ef3
Suppose A(K) = O. Then the LHS of the equation will be strictly less than
zero. If d~Ef3 < 0 and f3 >fl., then the RHS will also be strictly less than zero
since F (f3) > 0 for {3 >fl.. Therefore, it is possible to find a set of cost parameters
and firm types such that the equation is satisfied. I will skip finding the specific
conditions for parameters.•
Derivation of FOe's for the discrete-case illustration
We will only provide a sketch of the derivation. The main program of the
social planner is to maximize the expected social welfare (over firm's type) sub-
ject to Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individual Rationality (IR) constraints
for each type. We will first state all these constraints, then eliminate some of
90The possibility of a corner solution for capacity level is only possible at K = 0, and
FOC's are also sufficient for any K > 0. Since a non-congested line can occur only with
K > 0, the analysis of the FOC is enough for our result.
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them.
IC constraints are
Efficient
Inefficient
U(Q) ~ U(7J) + 1/1(e(/3)) -1/1 (e(7J) - /3 ; fl K 2 (/3) x i2 (/3))
U(/3) ~ U(fl) + 1/1(e(Q)) -1/1 (e(fl) - /3 ; fl K 2 (Q) xi2(fl))
IR constraints are
Efficient
Inefficient
U({}) ~ 0
U(lJ) ~ 0
Note that the IC constraint for the efficient type and the IR constraint for
the inefficient type implies the IR constraint for the efficient type. Hence, we
can eliminate the IR constraint for the efficient type. Moreover, the IR con-
straint for the inefficient type must be binding, Le. U(lJ) = o. Otherwise, we
can decrease both U(lJ) and U({}) by the same small amount without violating
any constraints. Furthermore, the IC constraint for the efficient type must be
binding, Le. the efficient type is indifferent between telling the truth and mis-
reporting. Otherwise, we can decrease U([}J without violating any remaining
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constraint, which is the IC constraint for the inefficient type. Finally, we as-
sume that the remaining constraint is not binding at the optimal solution. This
needs to be checked at the end.
In summary, the social planner chooses e([i) , e({J) , U([i) , K([i) , K({J) , X12([i) , X12({J)
to solve the maximization problem subject to one equality constraint, which is
the IC constraint for the efficient type. This equality constraint can be used
to eliminate one variable, U(!i) , after which the problem reduces to an uncon-
strained maximization problern. Since U(!i) will be expressed only in terms of
variables related to the inefficient type, the FOC's for the inefficient type will
be distorted by these additional terms. We skip writing the objective function,
since it is too long to fit here and it is very similar to the function for the
continuous-type case.•
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4. CONCLUSION
Our analysis gives us two main insights. First, the result of under-investment in
line capacity by a line owner cannot be generalized to cases where line reliability
is also a choice variable. Therefore, empirical studies are needed to test the spe-
cific conditions that lead to various results about the comparison of investment
by the line owner with the first-best level of investment for society. Second,
an increase in electricity demand, or a higher cost of generation at expensive
generating units does not necessarily increase the expected benefit of building
transmission lines on the network. This somewhat surprising result follows from
the trade-off between reliability benefits and congestion costs of having a new
transmission line.
Throughout the analysis in this thesis, we treat line reliability as a choice
variable instead of being fixed by industry standards, or only by engineering
rules. We argue that line reliability needs to be determined according to eco-
nomic principles, which takes into account the benefits and costs of reliability.
But these benefits and costs depend partly on line capacity, hence our treatment
of both capacity and reliability as decision variables captures possible interde-
pendencies between them.
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In the context of regulation, if a policy-maker focuses only on the regulation
of line capacity, the regulated company will still have opportunity to exercise
its market power by varying the level of reliability. Depending on the struc-
tures of costs and of demand, the profit-maximizing monopolist may under- or
over-supply reliability relative to the optimum, whether or not line capacity is
regulated. Therefore, both capacity and reliability have to be regulated instead
of only capacity.
We find that a benevolent social planner may assign less value to a mar-
ginal increase in line reliability compared to the owner of that transmission line.
Specifically, in a setting where the line owner is paid nothing when the line is
down, and rewarded by the shadow value of capacity when the line is up, ex-
pected marginal benefit of reliability for society is less than expected marginal
benefit for the monopolist for small levels of capacity. Therefore, an unregulated
line owner can pick a higher level of reliability compared to the social planner.
It is even possible for the line owner to over-invest in both capacity and
reliability. The result depends on the cross-cost elasticity of the cost of build-
ing a line, and on whether the first-best level of capacity is too low. Such a
contradiction with the established under-investment result in the literature can
be regarded as a warning sign to regulators who may be designing regulatory
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policies to alleviate the under-investment by line owners. A regulation policy
which does not take line reliability into account may lead to sub-optimal results.
We characterized the optimal regulation contract for capacity and reliability
under incomplete information. We used a well-known property in regulation
theory to show that the first-best levels of capacity and reliability can be ob-
tained if the cost function takes a special separable form. This means that the
existence of asymmetric information does not necessarily cause the regulator to
distort incentives to provide capacity and reliability.
We also examined how changes in some exogenous parameters affect the
regulator's decision to build a new transmission line. One result shows that
an exogenous increase in electricity demand does not necessarily improve the
attractiveness of building a line. If the new line will be congested once built,
then reliability benefits of having the line can be offset by the costs of newly
created congestion. Although this result seems counter-intuitive, it follows from
the special characteristics of transmission technology. One can reduce capacity
of a network to transmit electricity by building new transmission capacity.
Our analysis suggests the need for empirical research in order to obtain more
specific results about the incentives and regulation of a line owner to provide
line capacity and reliability. We plan to extend the analysis in this thesis to the
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context of recently proposed RTOs in the U.S. Since an RTO can be thought to
be a coalition of line owners, such a study needs to employ tools of cooperative
game theory.
Another future research project is the formulation of a mechanism to im-
plement the optimal regulation that we characterized in this thesis. One can
analyze the conditions under which the optimal contract can be implemented
by linear payment contracts.
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5. APPENDIX: TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGY
Electricity divides itself in a network according to Kirchoff Laws, and the amount
of power flow between any two connected nodes (or junctions) is determined by
a specific function of voltage angles at those nodes. The first Kirchoff Law states
that total power flowing into a node must be equal to total power flowing out
of that node. The second Kirchoff Law is related to voltage: total change in
voltage within a closed circuit loop must be zero.
We will first present the AC (Alternating Current)91 flow technology. Con-
sider a network with n nodes and m lines. Each line is characterized by its
impedance, which is roughly a measure of friction on the line. The impedance
of line k is expressed in complex numbers as rk + iXk, where rk represents the
resistance and Xk represents the reactance of line k. Each node is associated
with a voltage level, a voltage angle, and a net power injection (which can be
negative). Let's denote the voltage level at node i by Vi, the voltage angle by
Oi, and the net power injection by qi. If line k connects nodes i and j, then
the amount of real92 power flowing from node i to node j is determined by the
91The other power flow technology is the DC (or Direct Current) flow. In DC circuits, power
flow is constant over time, but it alternates in sinusoidal waves in AC circuits. Both technologies
are used in modern networks.
92Electricity power is composed of two parts: real power and reactive power. Real power
can be transformed into useful work, but reactive power cannot produce useful work. Instead,
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following formula:
where Pk is the power flowing on line k, Gk = ~, and Yk = ~.T k +Xk Tk+X k
The first Kirchoff Law can then be written as
i=l, ... ,n.
where Ci is the set of lines that are connected to node i.
Although AC power technology is more widely used than DC technology,
the sinusoidal power-flow function is difficult to analyze both analytically and
numerically. Therefore, we will employ a DC-flow approximation93 to simplify
the analysis. Assume that voltage levels at each node is stabilized at unity by
supplying necessary reactive power to the system. Then, Vi = 1 Vi. Moreover,
assume that voltage angle differences are small, i.e. ()i - ()j ~ O. Then, sin(()i -
()j) ~ 0, and COS(()i - ()j) ~ 1. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that
there is no transmission loss on the network, Le. rk = Gk = O. Then, power flow
equation becomes
k = 1, ... , m. (5.1)
reactive power is used for maintaning voltage and frequency on networks. We will omit the
treatment of reactive power, because its economic impact on a network is relatively unimportant.
93The DC-flow approximation is employed quite extensively in both Electrical Engineering
literature and Economics literature. See Hogan [10], Nasser [16], and Chao and Peck [6].
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The next step is to solve for power flows as functions of injections at nodes.
Once we obtain the solution, we will be able to tell the amount of power flowing
on each line in response to power injections (generation of power, or demand for
power). Let P = [PI P2 '" Pm]' be the vector of power flows, (j = [e 1 e2 ... en]'
be the vector of voltage angles, and Q = [ql q2 .,. qn]' be the vector of net power
injections at nodes.
We will introduce an m x n matrix, T, that shows topology of the network,
that is the relation between nodes and lines. The matrix is composed of only
+1, -1, and 0 as possible entries, that gives us information on which lines are
connected to each node, and also on the direction of power flows. In order to
form the matrix, one first chooses an arbitrary94 direction of power flow for each
line. If line k connects nodes i and j, and if it flows from node i to node j, then
the ki'th entry of the matrix T will take a value of +1, the kj'th entry will be
-1, and all the remaining entries on the k'th row will be O.
Let ak = -.L be the admittance of line k, and A be the m x m diagonal
Xk
matrix whose entries on the diagonal are ak's. Then we can write the power-
flow equation 5.1 in vector form as
94The specific direction chosen at this stage is not important, because the solution of power
flow as a function of net injections at nodes will give us the same amount of power flow (in
absolute value) regardless of the direction that we have chosen for power flows.
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The first Kirchoff Law in vector form can be written as
- (-)'QnXl = Tmxn Pmx1 .
Substituting Pinto Q reveals
(5.2)
- _ n_
Note that the matrix T'A T is not of full rank, because E qi = [1 ... 1hxnQ =
i=l
o. One can see this by looking at the columns of the matrix T' : each column
consists of one +1, one -1, and zeros since each line connects only two nodes.
This is another way of saying that the sum of positive injections (that we put
into the network) must be equal to the sum of negative injections (that we
consume) in a lossless95 network. Therefore, we will choose an arbitrary node
as the reference node, and express the voltage angle at all other networks in
terms of the angle at the reference node. Assume w.l.o.g. that On = o. Then, we
can drop the last column of T (since the last column will only have zeros after
multiplying it with B), and the last elements of Q and B. Now we can redefine
our reduced matrices as Tmx(n-l) , Q(n-l)xl' and O(n-l)xl in order to re-write
n
95In a network with losses, E qi =Total Losses.
i=l
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equation 5.2 as follows
Q = T'A T fJ, or
fJ = (T'A T)-I Q.
But fJn = aalso implies that PmxI = Amxm Tmxn BnxI = A T fJ. Substituting
for fJ from the previous line gives us the relation between flows and injections as
we aimed:
(5.3)
We will now illustrate equation 5.3 by using the triangular network in Figure
1, which has 3 nodes and 3 lines (n = m = 3). Assume that all three lines have
identical reactance values. Then, A = a Imxm where a is a positive scalar, and
I is the identity matrix. Let PI denote the power flowing from node 1 to node
3, P2 denote the power flowing from node 1 to node 2, and P3 denote the power
flowing from node 2 to node 3. Then the matrix T becomes
+1 0-1
T = +1 -1 a
a +1 -1
Hence the reduced matrix T (which was obtained by trimming the last col-
umn of T) becomes
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+1 a
T = +1 -1
a +1
Simple matrix algebra reveals that equation 5.3 will take the following form:
+2/3 +1/3
P = +1/3 -1/3
+1/3 +2/3
[:: ].
Now we can see how injections to the network creates power flows on each
line. For example, amount of power flowing on line 2 (connecting nodes 1 and
2) is given by the formula P2 = ~(ql - Q2). Moreover, the power flow equation
also gives us information on how much power will flow on each line as power is
injected at a particular node96 • For example, 2/3 of power injected at node 1
flows on line 1 (between nodes 1 and 3), and the remaining 1/3 of it will flow
on lines 2 and 3.
960ne might wonder what happens to power flows as q3 (or the injection at the reference node)
changes. We cannot see it from the power flow equation that we obtained. The reason for that
n
comes from the relation among power injections. Since L qi = 0, it means that q3 = -(ql +q2).
i=l
That is, one cannot change the injection at the reference node without changing at least one of
other injections. Since we know the relation between the injections at nodes 1 or 2 and power
flows, we can find how an additional injection at the reference node changes the power flows.
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